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Abstract
As many human currently depend on technologies to assist with daily tasks,
there are more and more applications which have been developed to be ¯t in one
small gadget such as smart phone and tablet. Thus, by carrying this small gadget
alone, most of our tasks are able to be settled e±ciently and fast. Until the end
of 20th century, mobile phones are only used to call and to send short message
service (sms). However, in early 21st century, a rapid revolution of communi-
cation technology from mobile phone into smart phone has been seen in which
the smart phone is equipped by 4G Internet line along with the telephone service
provider line. Thus, the users are able to make a phone call, send messages using
variety of application such as Whatsapp and Line, send email, serving websites,
accessing maps and handling some daily tasks via online using online banking,
online shopping and online meetings via video conferences. In previous years, if
there are cases of missing children or missing cars, the victims would rely on the
police investigation. But now, as easy as uploading a noti¯cation about the loss
on Facebook and spread the news among Facebook users, there are more people
are able to help in the search. Despite the advantages that can be obtained using
these technologies, there are a group of irresponsible people who take advan-
tage of current technologies for their own self-interest. Among the applications
that are usually being used by almost Internet users and also are often misused
by cyber criminals are email and websites. Therefore, we take this initiative to
make enhancement in cyber security application to avoid the Internet users from
being trapped and deceived by the trick of cyber criminals by developing detec-
tion system of malicious spam email and Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS)
iii
backscatter.
Imagine that a notice with a logo of Mobile Phone company is received by
an email informing that the customer had recently run up a large mobile phone
bill. A link regarding the bill is attached for him/her to ¯nd out the details.
Since, the customer thinks that the billing might be wrong, thus the link is
clicked. However, the link is directed to a webpage which displays a status that
currently the webpage is under construction. Then the customer closes the page
and thinking of to visit the website again at other time. Unfortunately, after
a single click actually a malicious ¯le is downloaded and installed without the
customer aware of it. That malicious ¯le most probably is a Trojan that capable
to steal con¯dential information from victim's computer. On the next day, when
the same person is using the same computer to log in the online banking, all
of a sudden ¯nd out that his/her money is lost totally. This is one of a worst
case scenario of malicious spam email which is usually handled by cybersecurity
¯eld. Another di®erent case of cybersecurity is the Distributed Denial of Services
(DDoS) attack. Let say, Company X is selling °owers via online in which the
market is from the local and international customer. The online business of
Company X is running normally as usual, until a day before mother's day, the
webpage of Company X is totally down and the prospective customers could not
open the webpage to make order to be sent specially for their beloved mother.
Thus, the customers would search another company that sells the same item. The
Company X server is down, most probably because of the DDoS attack where a
junk tra±c is sent to that company server which makes that server could not
serve the request by the legitimate customers. This attack e®ect not only the
pro¯t of the company, but also reputation damage, regular customer turnover
and productivity decline.
Unfortunately, it is di±cult for a normal user like us to detect malicious spam
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email or DDoS attack with naked eyes. It is because recently the spammers
and attacker had improved their strategy so that the malicious email and the
DDoS packets are hardly able to be di®erentiated with the normal email and
data packets. Once the Social Engineering is used by the spammers to create
relevant email content in the malicious spam email and when a new campaign
of DDoS attack is launched by the attacker, no normal users are capable to
distinguish the benign and malicious email or data packets. This is where my
Ph.D project comes in handy. My Ph.d is focusing on constructing a detection
system of malicious spam email and DDoS attack using a large number of dataset
which are obtained by a server that collect double-bounce email and darknet for
malicious spam email detection system and DDoS backscatter detection system,
respectively. As many up-to-date data are used during the learning, the detection
system would become more robust to the latest strategy of the cybercriminal.
Therefore, the scenario mentioned above can be avoided by assisting the user
with important information at the user-end such as malicious spam email ¯lter
or at the server ¯rewall. First of all, the method to learn large-scale stream
data must be solved before implementing it in the detection system. Therefore,
in Chapter 2, the general learning strategy of large-scale data is introduced to
be used in the cybersecurity applications which are discussed in Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4, respectively.
One of a critical criterion of the detection system is capable to learn fast because
after the learning, the updated information needs to be passed to user to avoid
the user from being deceived by the cybercriminal. To process large-scale data
sequences, it is important to choose a suitable learning algorithm that is capable
to learn in real time. Incremental learning has an ability to process large data
in chunk and update the parameters after learning each chunk. Such type of
learning keep and update only the minimum information on a classi¯er model.
vTherefore, it requires relatively small memory and short learning time. On the
other hand, batch learning is not suitable because it needs to store all training
data, which consume a large memory capacity. Due to the limited memory, it is
certainly impossible to process online large-scale data sequences using the batch
learning. Therefore, the learning of large-scale stream data should be conducted
incrementally.
This dissertation contains of ¯ve chapters. In Chapter 1, the concept of in-
cremental learning is brie°y described and basic theories on Resource Allocating
Network (RAN) and conventional data selection method are discussed in this
chapter. Besides that, the overview of this dissertation is also elaborated in this
chapter. In Chapter 2, we propose a new algorithm based on incremental Radial
Basis Function Network (RBFN) to accelerate the learning in stream data. The
data sequences are represented as a large chunk size of data given continuously
within a short time. In order to learn such data, the learning should be carried
out incrementally. Since it is certainly impossible to learn all data in a short pe-
riod, selecting essential data from a given chunk can shorten the learning time. In
our method, we select data that are located in untrained or \not well-learned"
region and discard data at trained or \well-learned" region. These regions are
represented by margin °ag. Each region is consisted of similar data which are
near to each other. To search the similar data, the well-known LSH method pro-
posed by Andoni et al. is used. The LSH method indeed has proven be able to
quickly ¯nd similar objects in a large database. Moreover, we utilize the LSH sʼ
properties; hash value and Hash Table to further reduced the processing time. A
°ag as a criterion to decide whether to choose or not the training data is added in
the Hash Table and is updated in each chunk sequence. Whereas, the hash value
of RBF bases that is identical with the hash value of the training data is used to
select the RBF bases that is near to the training data. The performance results of
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the numerical simulation on nine UC Irvine (UCI) Machine Learning Repository
datasets indicate that the proposed method can reduce the learning time, while
keeping the similar accuracy rate to the conventional method. These results indi-
cate that the proposed method can improve the RAN learning algorithm towards
the large-scale stream data processing.
In Chapter 3, we propose a new online system to detect malicious spam emails
and to adapt to the changes of malicious URLs in the body of spam emails by
updating the system daily. For this purpose, we develop an autonomous system
that learns from double-bounce emails collected at a mail server. To adapt to new
malicious campaigns, only new types of spam emails are learned by introducing an
active learning scheme into a classi¯er model. Here, we adopt Resource Allocating
Network with Locality Sensitive Hashing (RAN-LSH) as a classi¯er model with
data selection. In this data selection, the same or similar spam emails that
have already been learned are quickly searched for a hash table using Locally
Sensitive Hashing, and such spam emails are discarded without learning. On
the other hand, malicious spam emails are sometimes drastically changed along
with a new arrival of malicious campaign. In this case, it is not appropriate to
classify such spam emails into malicious or benign by a classi¯er. It should be
analyzed by using a more reliable method such as a malware analyzer. In order
to ¯nd new types of spam emails, an outlier detection mechanism is implemented
in RAN-LSH. To analyze email contents, we adopt the Bag-of-Words (BoW)
approach and generate feature vectors whose attributes are transformed based
on the normalized term frequency-inverse document frequency. To evaluate the
developed system, we use a dataset of double-bounce spam emails which are
collected from March 1, 2013 to May 10, 2013. In the experiment, we study the
e®ect of introducing the outlier detection in RAN-LSH. As a result, by introducing
the outlier detection, we con¯rm that the detection accuracy is enhanced on
vii
average over the testing period.
In Chapter 4, we propose a fast Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) backscat-
ter detection system to detect DDoS backscatter from a combination of protocols
and ports other than the following two labeled packets: Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) Port 80 (80/TCP) and User datagram Protocol (UDP) Port 53
(53/UDP). Usually, it is hard to detect DDoS backscatter from the unlabeled
packets, where an expert is needed to analyze every packet manually. Since it
is a costly approach, we propose a detection system using Resource Allocating
Network (RAN) with data selection to select essential data. Using this method,
the learning time is shorten, and thus, the DDoS backscatter can be detected
fast. This detection system consists of two modules which are pre-processing
and classi¯er. With the former module, the packets information are transformed
into 17 feature-vectors. With the latter module, the RAN-LSH classi¯er is used,
where only data located at untrained region are selected. The performance of the
proposed detection system is evaluated using 9,968 training data from 80/TCP
and 53/UDP, whereas 5,933 test data are from unlabeled packets which are col-
lected from January 1st, 2013 until January 20th, 2014 at National Institute of
Information and Communications Technology (NICT), Japan. The results indi-
cate that detection system can detect the DDoS backscatter from both labeled
and unlabeled packets with high recall and precision rate within a short time.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we discussed the conclusions and the future work of our
study: RAN-LSH classi¯er, malicious spam email detection system and DDoS
backscatter detection system.
viii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The rapid growth of storage technology and computer networks has brought
the opportunity for researchers to get involved in the processing of large-scale
stream data which consists of collecting data in real time, storing, mining and
analyzing the knowledge from data. Along with the development of the internet
and sensor technologies, a large amount of data is continuously generated in our
daily life and such data are typically provided as a time series of large data chunk,
so-called big stream data. For such a large-scale stream data, it is usually di±cult
to learn all the data given at the same time or within a short period. Stream data
are characterized as an unlimited sequence of data which are given continuously
in a short time and whose data distribution is changed over time1). There are
at least three major issues to be solved: (1) system that capable to monitor for
each second of activity continuously, (2) the growing number of data and (3)
how to learn fast. To solve the ¯rst issue, it seems that human resource is not
an option since human need to rest and could not maintain our focus for a long
time, besides our limit to process complicated calculation with high speed. Thus,
machine learning is a good alternative to replace human resource which is capable
to work non-stop with high speed and with a consistent working performance.
Since machine learning is used to solve the ¯rst issue, the solution for the other
two remaining issues must be related to machine learning too. As for the second
issue, it can be solved by learning incrementally using machine learning approach
which able to keeps only important information on the previously given data.
2Whereas, to cater third issue, the computational time need to be reduced by
removing unimportant calculations. The redundant calculations to be discarded
should be selected carefully so that the performance would not degrade much.
Therefore, in this dissertation, a novel technique to select essential data and to
learn Radial Basis Function (RBF) bases locally is introduced which based on
Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) approach.
Among the research area within the scope of large-scale stream data stream
study is cybersecurity application that meets the criteria of stream data. Those
criteria are the generation of unlimited data and the characteristics that represent
a class label are constantly changing when a cyber criminals attack's techniques
evolved. Since more and more people rely on electronic gadgets (i.e., computers,
smartphones and tablets) and internet connections, there are those who try to
manipulate the advantages of these technologies for cyberbullying. Because of
this reason, the importance of cyber security research has raised up in order to
avoid users being deceived by the recent tactics of cyber criminals. For example,
the spammers send spam emails that contain malicious software to steal impor-
tant data from a particular individual or organization and the attackers send an
attack toward certain websites via Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) to pre-
vent other users from accessing certain website. Both examples of cyber security
applications have been developed in this study to detect any harmful input (i.e.,
malicious spam emails and DDoS backscatter) that would contribute to adverse
e®ect on the users.
Technology without borders has now becoming preference for human to com-
municate to each other. It is because this technology is not only very fast, but
also is easy to be used to facilitate our daily tasks. One of striking example is
email application that functions as virtual letter. Although the letter was still
used to send original copy of document, usually an email would be sent prior
to the original copy. Email is not just used by those registered companies and
organizations, in fact email is also used by individuals for personal usage. Due to
3the e±ciency of email application, most companies and organizations own their
internal email system to distribute important information from board of exec-
utive to their subordinates without keying in one by one email addresses. It
is quite problematical task if the organizations have hundreds of sta® as their
subordinate. Apart of simplicity and fast operation o®ered by email application,
an email address has also becoming an identi¯cation (ID) of Internet users in
cyber world. For example, to sign up a social media like Facebook, an email ad-
dress is required as the ID to distinguish every single user of Facebook. Since
the email application is used by almost all Internet users, thus this application is
manipulate by a group of individuals to commit cybercrime. As far as I know, the
studies which conducted to combat cybercrime through the medium of email only
focused on spam email detection and also malicious emails detection targeted at
a speci¯c individual known as Targeted Malicious Email (TME). To the best of
my knowledge from previous studies, there are still no studies on the detection of
malicious spam email in general, which does not only targeted at TME, but also
all email users. Thus, the development of malicious spam email detection system
has become another novelty in this dissertation.
Besides the email application, another important application is website or In-
ternet browsing. Currently, the websites are o±cially being used to represent
some organizations by explaining their objectives, vision and general overview.
In addition, the websites also usually equipped with online services to assist the
deal between the customers and the service provider. For instance, the bank in-
stitutions provide the online banking for transferring money using Internet and
also online shop for purchasing desired items without having to go to the shop
physically. Thus, to attack a speci¯c websites would means that the attacker
has intent to bring down the high-pro¯t company and high-pro¯le organizations
through cyberattacks or known as DDoS attack. As a consequent of DDoS at-
tack, the website is likely to face server-down in which the customers or Internet
users are not able to access the website that needed at speci¯c period. This can
4lead to the loss of millions of dollars for a large corporation if the tra±c on the
company network is not resolved quickly. DDoS attacks can be through labeled
packet from Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) using Port 80 and Port 53, respectively. Generally, it is very di±cult to
identify DDoS attacks from other combination of protocols and port numbers
other than TCP Port 80 (80/TCP) and UDP Port 53 (53/UDP), because there
are no speci¯c rules to di®erentiate the network tra±c of protocol and port num-
ber excluding 80/TCP and 53/UDP. Normally, an expert is needed to analyze the
tra±c of those unlabeled packets. Thus, the DDoS backscatter detection system
has became my third novelty in this dissertation.
To process large-scale stream data, it is important to choose a suitable learning
algorithm that is capable to learn in real time. Incremental learning has an ability
to process large data2) in chunk and update the parameters after learning each
chunk. Such type of learning, keep and update only the minimum information
on a classi¯er model. Therefore, it requires relatively small memory and short
learning time. On the other hand, batch learning is not suitable because it needs
to store all training data, which consume a large memory capacity. Due to the
limited memory, it is certainly impossible to process large-scale stream data online
using the batch learning. Therefore, the learning of large-scale stream data should
be conducted incrementally.
Another criteria to be considered for learning large-scale stream data is to select
essential data to be learned. The selection of essential data is often conducted
based on the margin of classi¯er outputs. Even if a large number of data are
given as a data sequences, there is no guarantee that all the data are useful
for learning and can e±ciently improved the accuracy of test data. Besides, in
supervised learning, a large training data correspond to a larger number of data
to be labeled by a supervisor. Hence, selecting the most useful training data can
reduce not only the amount of supervision required for e®ective learning3), but
also the processing time due to the decreasing number of training data.
5Although Nearest Neighbors (NNs) search plays an important role in vari-
ous machine learning areas, it has a limitation when a high dimensional data
is given. To overcome this problem, LSH provides an alternative to process
high-dimensional data by approximating similarity search problem4, 5, 6, 7, 8). In
a general hashing, every input is assigned to a di®erent bucket to avoid collision,
while inputs of LSH are assigned to the same bucket when the input data are close
to each other. Consequently, LSH is able to search similar data faster because
LSH can ¯nd the nearest neighbors in linear time as opposed to the quadratic
pair-wise approach of the conventional nearest neighbor, which give advantage to
high dimensional data and large-scale data. However, a major limitation of LSH
is originated from its large memory consumption; that is, to keep both high recall
and high precision, a large hash table is needed.
Besides the challenge of processing stream data, cybersecurity ¯eld is facing
another serious issue which is to obtain cybersecurity data9) that can be used
for developing detection system and evaluating the e®ectiveness of the proposed
method. To overcome this, White House Cyberspace has given some recommen-
dations to the action plan in the Cyberspace Policy Review10), which is one of the
recommendations is to set up a database for cybersecurity data. The database is
used to assist researchers whom are struggling in the challenges of cybersecurity
attacks that are continuously evolved in a short time. This idea had inspired
RTI International and DHS Science & Technology (S&T) Directorate to estab-
lished a sharing medium for di®erent types of security-related datasets based on
trusted framework, namely the Protected Repository for Defense of Infrastructure
Against Cyber Threats (PREDICT). In addition to providing secure and central-
ized data, PREDICT also ensure the con¯dentiality and privacy of those who
contribute data to the system. This e®ort had given a drive to the cybersecurity
researchers to design robust software to counter cyber criminals.
Although PREDICT is capable to provide a large number of cybersecurity
data, in reality (1) it is di±cult to assign a class label to each of data, and (2) the
6datasets usually have unbalanced number of positive and negative examples. The
labeling process for those unbalanced data is very challenging especially when a
new campaign is launched rapidly. The experts are required to analyze the new
form of attack which requires a high focus and a quite amount of time. In general,
the unbalanced datasets have a higher proportion negative example (normal data)
than the positive example (sample to be detected i.e., malicious spam email and
DDoS attack). Therefore, in this dissertation, another method to acquire the
data is introduced. In this study, the autonomous data collection system which
is used has a little di®erence compared to PREDICT system. Instead of obtaining
the data from particular individuals and networks like PREDICT, the data for
this study were obtained from servers that are collecting suspicious data or data
that are not only failed to be received by recipients, but also unable to be sent
back to the sender. Thus, it is expected that there are more positive examples
able to be obtained using this approach compared to that in PREDICT.
For the detection malicious spam email application, the servers that collect
double-bounce email are used to obtain malicious spam email data, while darknets
are used to collect DDoS backscatter data. The double-bounce email happens
when the email sent by the sender is not received by the recipient. It might be
due to the owner of the email address has already deactivate the email address or
it might be because of the recipient's inbox is full and overload. This requires the
email to be returned back to the sender. However, since the attacker wanted to
hide his/her identity, the sender's email address is often faked, and thus the email
could not be returned back to the sender. This unreceived email and unreturned
email which is described as bouncing two times, would be collected by a particular
server. Double-bounce email consists of spam emails that usually have a malicious
intention. Besides the spam emails, there are also a small portion of normal email
which is gathered by double-bounce email server, as a result of unintentionally
¯lled in wrong recipients' email addresses and senders' email addresses. A similar
mechanism of double-bounce email can be seen in the backscatter packet data
7collected by darknet. It is obvious that the packets data received by darknets
would also hold a malicious intention, because in reality, there is no purpose to
communicate with IP address without any host. Since the target server's source
IP address is not connected to any host, the data packet must be returned to
its destination IP address. However, due to the destination IP address is faked
and could not be sent back to the destination IP address, the backscatter e®ect
is happening.
In this study, an autonomous labeling system is introduced and used in the
propose detection system. Due to the positive samples were more numerous in
this autonomous data collection, the process of analyzing the group to be detected
(positive examples) is more convenient and reassuring. To assign a class label,
rule-based approach is used in which the behaviors of malicious spam email and
DDoS attack are analyzed using training data. For the malicious spam email
detection system, SPIKE system has been used to label the double-bounce email,
while for the DDoS attack, the analysis of tra±c features has been used to assign
a class label to darknet packets. This approach provides an autonomous labeling
system that can reduce the usage of manpower.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, a brief explanation are
given on basic theories of machine learning. Previous studies on conventional
incremental classi¯er, selection strategies for data and RBF bases, and general
LSH are discussed in Section 1.3. The general overview of the proposed methods
in Chapter 2, 3 and 4 are discussed in Section 1.4, Section 1.5 and Section 1.6, re-
spectively. Section 1.7 shows the evaluation methods that are in this dissertation.
Finally, the thesis outlines and objectives are explained in Section 1.8.
1.2 Basic Theories of Machine Learning
1.2.1 Type of Learning
The machine learning ¯eld has become one of the most famous method to
solve classi¯cation and detection problem for various application. Some classi-
8¯cation task is easy for human such as di®erentiating images like cat and dog.
However, most of the classi¯cation task require a full attention and generally
are very complex to be done by human due to our limitation to analyze such
a high-computational processes. In machine learning, training data are used by
the classi¯er model to learn and identify the class boundary which can separate
di®erent classes. Thus, when new data namely test data are given to the system,
the updated model can provide class label of all test data.
Classi¯cation or detection task is a process to obtain the class label of unseen
data that has not been learned by classi¯er model or the developed system. To
perform a classi¯cation task, there are two di®erent approaches to be chose which
are through supervised learning or through unsupervised learning. Figure 1.1
shows the di®erence of these types of learning. The most noticeable di®erence
of both learning type are the necessity of the class label during learning phase.
For supervised learning, the class labels served as a supervisor to ¯nd the class
boundary (see Fig. 1.1 : left side). Meanwhile, unsupervised learning does not
require class label. Thus, the classi¯cation of unsupervised learning is made using
clustering technique (see Fig. 1.1 : right side) in which the system will grouped
the nearby data as a class.
1.2.2 Learning Scheme
Figure 1.2 illustrates the learning and evaluation procedures using training data
and test data, respectively. The upper-side of this ¯gure shows the illustration of
large-scale stream data in which the incoming data are given in chunk of di®erent
sizes at a spesi¯c time sequences. Here, initial training data is denoted as t0,
training data as ti and test data as ti+1. Each training data consists of feature
vectors x and target vector d. Whereas, test data only have feature vectors x
as input to the classi¯er model. As mention in Section 1.2.1, the training data
would identify the class boundary and update the previous parameters of the
model. This updated classi¯er model is used to classify the test set which is
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Figure 1.1 The di®erences between supervised learning and unsupervised learn-
ing.
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Figure 1.2 Training data and test data of large-scale data sequences.
unseen by the model.
There are two types of learning scheme which are incremental learning and
batch learning. With the former type of learning scheme, the learning is carried
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out chunk by chunk without storing previous data. For the ¯rst learning stage,
initial structure is developed using initial training data with chunk-t1 as test data.
The learning continues by using the following chunk such as chunk-t1 as training
data and chunk-t2 as test data, until all data are ¯nished. With the later type
of learning scheme, the learning is carried out using a group of chunk data. For
instance, chunk-t0 to chunk-t2 as training data and chunk-t3 to chunk-t4 as test
data.
1.3 Previous Studies: Conventional Classi¯er, Data Se-
lection Method, RBF Bases Selection and Fast Near
Neighbor Search
1.3.1 Modi¯ed Resource Allocating Network (RAN)
Figure 1.3 illustrates the structure of the RAN classi¯er. Let I, J , and K
be the numbers of inputs, RBF outputs, and network outputs, respectively.
When inputs x = fx1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; xIgT are given to RAN, the RBF outputs y(x) =
fy1(x); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; yJ(x)gT and the network outputs z(x) = fz1(x); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; zK(x)gT are
11
calculated as follows:
yj(x) = exp
µ
¡kx¡ cjk
2
¾2j
¶
(j = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; J) (1.1)
zk(x) =
JX
j=1
wkjyj(x) + »k (k = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K) (1.2)
where cj = fcj1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; cjIgT and ¾2j are the center and the variance of the jth RBF
unit, respectively; wkj and »k are the connection weight from the jth RBF unit
to the kth output unit and its bias, respectively.
Algorithm 1 shows the learning algorithm of a modi¯ed Resource Allocating
Network (RAN). The learning of RAN is divided into two phases: the addition
of RBF units (Lines 4-5 and Lines 16-17) and the update of connection weights
between hidden and output units (Lines 9-13). Once RBF units are allocated,
the centers are ¯xed afterwards. The connection weights W = ffwjkgJj=1gKk=1 of
the modi¯ed RAN are updated by solving the following equation11):
©W =D (1.3)
where © is a matrix of RBF outputs and D is a target matrix. Suppose that
a training data (x;d) is given and Jth RBF centers (cj;wj) (j = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; J)
have already been allocated. In order to suppress the interference caused by the
incremental learning, the modi¯ed RAN is trained with some RBF centers as
well as a new data. Therefore, a target matrix D in Eq. (1.3) is formed as
follows: D = fdx;dc1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ;dcJgT , while a matrix of RBF outputs © is given
by © = fy(x);y(c1); ¢ ¢ ¢ ;y(cJ)g. To obtain W in Eq. (1.3), Singular Value
Decomposition (SVD) is often used, and the solution is given by the following
equation:
W = V H¡1UTD (1.4)
where V and U are orthogonal matrices and H is a diagonal matrix.
Since the computational complexity of SVD is O(J3), the number of RBFs is a
key to reduce the learning time. Let us introduce the selection of active RBF in
12
the modi¯ed RAN. Algorithm 1 shows a pseudo-code of the RAN learning with
RBF selection. As seen at Line 8 in Algorithm 1, when the connection weights
are updated, only a part of RBFs are selected and used to de¯ne the matrix of
RBF outputs ©0. The matrix ©0 is decomposed into the orthogonal matrices V 0,
U 0 and a diagonal matrix H 0 by using SVD. Then, the connections weights W 0
are updated for the selected RBF units, while the connections for the other RBF
units are not changed. An example of adding new RBF bases in RAN classi¯er
and the calculation of RBF output, network output and connection weights is
shown in Table 1.1.
In order to suppress the catastrophic interference, it is empirically known that
some RBF units should be learned along with a given training data, so that the
previous memories are not forgotten when learning new data. In conventional
RAN, the problem is solved by learning local region which is approximated using
C1 continuous polynomial without calculating the RBF outputs12). Whereas, the
same goal is achieved by another variant of RAN, RAN with Long Term Memory
(RAN-LTM) where it carried out the learning with memory items that are stored
in LTM13, 14, 15). Nevertheless, di®erent approach are used in this study which
can be easily implemented by using LSH where active RBF units are able to be
selected. This will be described in the later chapter.
1.3.2 Margin-based data selection
One of the most frequently used approaches in active learning for data selection
is based on output margins. The calculation of an output margin ¢z is conducted
by subtracting the second largest network output zc2 from the largest network
output zc1 as follows:
¢z = zc1 ¡ zc2 = argmax
k02f1;:::;Kg
zk0(¹xe)¡ argmax
k002f1;:::;Kgnk0
zk00(¹xe): (1.5)
where zc1 and zc2 are the largest and the second largest outputs of modi¯ed RAN,
respectively. Network output value represent the degree of belonging to a speci¯c
classes. If the network output of an A output unit is high zA, it means that
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Figure 1.4 Margin-based data selection.
the data is highly belongs to the A class. This data will give a high output
margin because the second highest network output is quite low. Compare to
another data that does not dominant to any classes where both the highest and
the second highest network outputs does not di®er much, the output margin will
be quite small. Generally, data with low network outputs should be selected to
be learned so that the classi¯er can classify correctly by modi¯ying the weight.
Thus, if the threshold of the margin µm is set to be very small, data that equal or
lower than the assigned margin threshold ¢z · µm would be selected. By doing
this, the number of training data to be learned by RAN are able to be reduced.
For instance (see Fig. 1.4), four training data are given which are (x1;dB),
(x2;dA), (x3;dC) and (x4;dC). The network output are calculated using Eq.
(1.2). If a threshold µm is set to 0.05, only x3 and x4 will be selected. As shown
in Fig. 1.4, x1 and x2 are correctly classi¯ed to their given class where the
network outputs at the same class (zB for data x1 and zA for data x2) are high.
Whereas for x3 and x4, since the network output does not dominant to any class
which indicate by a low output margin, these data will be selected to be trained
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Learn all RBF bases Learn only local RBF bases
Figure 1.5 The illustration of global-RAN and local-RAN.
by classi¯er model.
1.3.3 RBF Selection
The training data after data selection and RBF bases are used to calculate the
connection weight as shown in Algorithm 1. Since the calculation of SVD to solve
the linear equation in Eq. (1.3) require a lot of time, by reducing the number
of RBF in the calculation will shortened the processing time. With this general
idea, the RBF bases selection are proposed to be included after data selection.
Basically Algorithm 1 shows the step of learning RAN. The di®erence between
global-RAN and local-RAN is the RBF bases that is used to calculate connection
weight. In global-RAN, all RBF bases are used to update the weight. Compared
to local-RAN, only RBF bases that are near to the training data are considered
during the calculation of weight. Figure 1.5 demonstrates the di®erence of global-
RAN and local-RAN, where only RBF bases that is near to the training data are
chosen. The RBF bases that is near to the training data will give more in°uence
to the network output value compared to RBF bases that is far. In Eq. (1.1)
shows that the farther the RBF bases or the value of ¹, the smaller the value of
RBF output and will not give much e®ect to the network output. Due to this
reason, only near RBF bases are selected to be learn since the elimination does
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not change the ¯nal result. Furthermore, the learning time is able to be reduced
if not all RBF bases are used.
1.3.4 Locality Sensitive Hashing
From large stream data, it is generally possible to obtain similar data in a
di®erent data sequence. Such data are redundant to a system because training
similar data will not improve the performance of a system. Based on this idea,
only data that are new to a system and have not been trained well should be
selected. To achieve this, similar data are needed to be search and removed from
training data. Unfortunately, the well-known nearest neighbor method is not
su±cient to ¯nd similar data in high-dimensional data. The larger the dimensions
are, the harder it will be to calculate the nearest neighbor due to the curse of
dimensionality.
Given that only approximate value of the similarity are needed, LSH pro-
vides an alternative to process high-dimensional data by approximating simi-
larity search problem4, 5, 6, 7, 8). So far this method has only been applied to
quickly ¯nd similar entries in large databases such as images, videos and songs.
The LSH method used randomized algorithm which does not guarantee an exact
answer but instead provides a high probability guarantee that it will return the
correct answer or close to it16). In a general hashing, every input is assigned to a
di®erent bucket to avoid collision, while inputs of LSH are assigned to the same
bucket when input data are close to each other. Consequently, LSH is able to
search similar data faster because LSH can ¯nd the nearest neighbors in linear
time as opposed to the quadratic pair-wise approach of the conventional nearest
neighbor. This will give an advantage to high dimensional data and large-scale
data. However, a major limitation of LSH is originated from its large memory
consumption; that is, to keep both high recall and high precision, a large hash
table is needed.
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1.4 The Proposed Classi¯er Model
In Chapter 2, a new incremental learning algorithm of Radial Basis Function
Network (RBFN) is proposed to accelerate the learning for large-scale stream
data. Along with the development of the internet and sensor technologies, a time
series of large data chunk are continuously generated in our daily life. Thus it
is usually di±cult to learn all the data within a short period. A remedy for this
is to select only essential data from a given data chunk and provide them to a
classi¯er model to learn. In the proposed method, only data in untrained regions,
which correspond to a region with a low output margin, are selected. The regions
are formed by grouping the data based on their near neighbor using LSH, in
which LSH has been developed to search neighbors quickly in an approximated
way. As the proposed method does not use all training data to calculate the
output margins, the time of the data selection is expected to be shortened. In
the incremental learning phase, in order to suppress catastrophic forgetting, LSH
technique is also exploited to select neighbor RBF units quickly. In addition, a
method to update the hash table in LSH is proposed so that the data selection
can be adaptive during the learning. From the performance of nine datasets, it
is con¯rmed that the proposed method can learn large-scale stream data quickly
without sacri¯cing the classi¯cation accuracies. This fact implies that the data
selection and the incremental learning work e®ectively in the proposed method.
The data selection based on output margins is one of the most frequently used
approaches in active learning. The conventional RAN-LTM method requires the
calculation of output margins for every training data candidates. Hence, such a
margin-based method results in increasing the number of RBF units and conse-
quently increasing the computational time. Therefore, as more data are given at
a time, real-time learning becomes more di±cult.
In the proposed method, to avoid the repetition of the output margin calcula-
tion, the data are divided into buckets where adjacent data are grouped in the
same bucket. To do this, a data selection method using LSH is proposed by com-
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bining with the margin-based method, where only unknown data in a new bucket
and not well-learned data are learned by RAN, whereas data that are well-learned
are ignored during the learning phase. However, by only implementing this idea,
the learning time is not drastically reduced because the learning time strongly
depends on the number of RBF bases17). Therefore, instead of learning all RBF
bases, a local learning algorithm is proposed in which only RBF bases with high
activations for a training data are selectively learned.
Apart of continuously generated, the distribution of data stream is also con-
stantly changes over time. The changes of data distribution would cause training
data to be scattered over the input space and located either at a knowned region
or at a new region. A known region is region that has been learned from pre-
vious training data. Whereas new region is region that have not been trained.
By learning a known and well-learned region repeatedly would not improve the
recognition accuracy, thus that training data that lies in that region should be
discarded to reduce the number of training data. In this study, data that lies in
unknown or not well-learned regions are used for learning.
To decide whether the region is unknown or not, neighbor of the given training
data is searched. If the training data has no neighbor or in other word the training
data is not surrounded by previous data, that region is de¯ned as unknown.
A commonly used distance metric for searching neighbor is Euclidean distance.
However, this method is usually computationally expensive, especially for high-
dimensional data. Another alternative method to approximate neighbor search
in high dimensional spaces is using LSH technique. The LSH method indeed has
proven be able to quickly ¯nd neighbor or similar objects in a large database.
The key idea of LSH method is to group a nearby data into the same group
or bucket. Firstly, the training data is mapped from a high-dimensional data
to several low-dimensional subspace which called hash functions. These hash
functions are projected from multiple directions and each of them are divided
into several partitions with a same width that assigned with a decimal values.
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The combination of decimal values from all hash functions would produce a hash
value where one bucket is represented by one hash value. Thus, training data
which are close to one another would be projected in the same partitions for each
hash functions and is assigned with the same bucket.
A data structure is needed to represent a large data input into hash value so
that the similarity search would only need a short time. By constructing a hash
table, similar data is able to be traced quickly by ¯nding data with the same
hash value. Since the hash table allows us to quickly ¯nd neighbor data for data
selection part, neighbor of RBF bases for learning near RBF bases can be found
by reusing the hash table to shorten the learning time in the classi¯er. Hence, for
the purpose of designing a fast learning algorithm, the following two functions
are introduced in the previously propose RAN-LTM:
(1) Fast data selection using LSH.
(2) Fast RBF-bases selection using LSH.
1.5 Cyber Security Application (1): Malicious Spam Email
Detection System
In Chapter 3, a new online system is proposed to detect malicious spam emails
and capable to adapt the changes of malicious URLs in the body of spam emails
by updating the system daily18). For this purpose, an autonomous system that
learns from double-bounce emails and collected at a mail server is developed. To
adapt to new malicious campaigns, only new types of spam emails are learned
by introducing an active learning scheme into a classi¯er model. Here, Resource
Allocating Network with Locality Sensitive Hashing (RAN-LSH) is adopted as a
classi¯er model with data selection. In this data selection, the same or similar
spam emails that have already been learned are quickly searched for a hash table
using Locally Sensitive Hashing, and such spam emails are discarded without
learning. On the other hand, malicious spam emails are sometimes drastically
changed along with a new arrival of malicious campaign. In this case, it is not
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Table 1.2 Previous studies on malicious spam email detection.
De¯nition and Background
Malicious spam email : Email that are embedded with attachments and/or URLs, which
give the oppurtunity for the malware to infect the computer19). The global spam rate out
of total of email tra±c is 60% in 2014, 66% in 2013 and 69% in 201220), which shown a
gradual decreased every year. Although, it is reported that the spam rate is dropped about
9% from 2012 to 2014, however according to this report20), the total volume of spam email
shows a consistent dropped about 1 billion every year. The main goal of most malicious
programs distributed via email is to steal con¯dential data. However, malware capable of
spreading spam and launching DDoS attacks was also popular. The most popular types of
malware are now multifunctional: they can steal data from the victim computer, make the
computer part of a botnet, or download and install other malicious programs without the
user's knowledge21).
Related Work
Author Proposed Method Motivation Advantages of the Pro-
posed Method
Deshmukh
et. al.22)
Focus on feature extrac-
tion of TME based on
random forest classi¯er.
Consists of ¯ve features:
(i) Sender, (ii) Subject,
(iii) Attachments, (iv)
Source, (v) Date and
Time)
Number of TME dataset
is small compare to spam
email.
(i) Random forest
classi¯er is under un-
supervised learning,
(ii) Dataset used is pre
anti-virus (dataset in-
cludes only those emails
that were passed by a
commercial anti-spam
system), (iii) Able to
hansle unbalanced data
Alazab et.
al.23)
Features such as preva-
lence, frequency, du-
ration of attacks, and
other features are used
to group them according
to authorship.
Lack of knowledge of cy-
bercriminals, their moti-
vation and their modus
operandi leads to many
lost battles between at-
tacker and anti-virus re-
searcher.
The information of au-
thorship can be used to
recognize future attacks
by the same groups of
spammers
Song et.
al24)
Spam clustering method
based on IP addresses.
Consists of two main
modules: (i) IP Based
Clusterer and (ii) Docu-
ment Based Clusterer
The fatal weekness of
three approaches for
clustering spam: (i)
email content (mainly
words):periodically
change the contents
of emails25), (ii)
URLs:active period
of URLs is extremely
short26) and (iii) domain
names:domain names as-
sociated with the scams
change frequently27).
The clustering method is
more robust to changes
of new campaign.
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appropriate to classify such spam emails into malicious or benign by a classi¯er. It
should be analyzed by using a more reliable method such as a malware analyzer.
In order to ¯nd new types of spam emails, an outlier detection mechanism is
implemented in RAN-LSH. To analyze email contents, the Bag-of-Words (BoW)
approach is adopted to generate feature vectors whose attributes are transformed
based on the normalized term frequency-inverse document frequency. To evaluate
the developed system, a dataset of double-bounce spam emails is used which
collected from March 1st, 2013 to May 10th, 2013. In the experiment, the e®ect
of introducing the outlier detection in RAN-LSH is analyzed. As a result, by
introducing the outlier detection, it is con¯rmed that the detection accuracy is
enhanced on average over the testing period.
To my knowledge, there is still no study which focus on malicious spam email
in general except the TME that aim for speci¯c targeted people. Malicious spam
email detection system in this study does not only focus to certain targeted
people, but instead, all the spam email are treated as potential malicious spam
email that can give harm to the email users' con¯dential data. A general literature
review on TME is shown by Table 1.2.
1.6 Cyber Security Application (2): DDoS Backscatter
Detection System
In Chapter 4, a fast detection system for DDoS backscatter using packets from
various protocols and port numbers is proposed, which is not restricted to only
the following two types of packets that can be labeled with simple rules called
\labeled packet": Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Port 80 (80/TCP) and
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Port 53 (53/UDP). Usually, it is not easy to
detect DDoS backscatter from the unlabeled packets, where an expert needs to
analyze packet tra±c manually. To deal with unlabeled packets, ¯rst, the detection
system would learns general rules of DDoS backscatter using information from
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Table 1.3 Previous studies on DDoS attack.
De¯nition and Background
DDoS attacks are launched by generating extremely large volume of tra±c that rapidly
exhausts available resources of target systems to intentionally disrupt network services28).
DDoS attacks explicitly threatens the stability of the Internet. Computer Economics29)
estimated that the total economic impact of Code Red was $2.6 billion, and Sircam cost
another $1.3 billion.
Related Work
Author Proposed Method Motivation Advantages of the Pro-
posed Method
Li et.
al30)
Attack detection can be
performed through ab-
normal behavior identi-
¯cation. The energy
distribution is utilized
based on wavelet analy-
sis to detect DDoS at-
tack tra±c.
Most of the methods in-
troduced so far are based
on appearance of DDoS
attack, such as spoofed
source IP address, band-
width distribution, at-
tack packet pattern etc.
However, attacker can
hide the appearance of
attack tra±c via packet
reshaping.
Wavelet analysis is able
to capture complex tem-
poral correlation across
multiple time scales with
very low computational
complexity, where a
spike is generated when
tra±c behaviors a®ected
by DDoS attack.
Chen et.
al.28)
Proposed a novel net-
work anomaly detection
algorithm (NADA) to
detect the abnormal traf-
¯c: (i) Pre-process net-
work tra±c by cumula-
tively averaging it with
a time range, (ii) AR
model which is a time
series model is used to
generate the prediction
of network tra±c, (iii)
Chaos theory is used to
analyze the prediction
error, (iv) Train a neural
network to detect DDoS
attacks.
It is di±cult to distin-
guish between DDoS at-
tacks and normal tra±c,
speci¯cally to di®erenti-
ate DDoS attack packets
from legitimate abrupt
packets.
This learning algorithm
can detect an anomaly
caused either by bursty
legitimate tra±c or by
DDoS °ooding attacks.
Zhang et.
al.31)
Propose an advanced
entropy-based (AEB)
scheme, which divides
variable rate DDOS at-
tacks into di®erent ¯elds
and treats each ¯eld
with di®erent methods.
The key challenge of
entropy-based DDOS de-
tection is how to de-
termine the most suit-
able threshold to de-
tect DDOS attacks accu-
rately.
Has signi¯cant better
performance on distin-
guishing waves of legal
tra±c and °ash crowds
from Low-rate Denial of
Service (LDOS) attack.
Advantages: simple
calculation, high sensi-
tivity, low false positive
rate, no need additional
network tra±c and
device.
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80/TCP and 53/UDP. After the learning process, the generalized detection sys-
tem is used to detect the DDoS backscatter from unlabeled packets. This detection
system consists of two main modules which are pre-processing and classi¯er. In
the pre-processing module, the incoming packets are transformed into feature vec-
tors. As for the classi¯er module, since it is important to detect DDoS backscatter
from all protocols as early as possible, RAN with data selection is used. Using
this classi¯er, the learning time is shorten because the classi¯er only learns es-
sential data. Here, essential data means the data located in \not well-learned"
regions, in which the classi¯er could not give trustable predictions. To quickly
search for the regions closest to given data, the well-known LSH method is used.
The performance of the proposed detection system is evaluated using 9,968
training data from labeled packets and 5,933 test data from unlabeled packets.
They are collected from January 1st, 2013 until January 20th, 2014 at National
Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), Japan. The
results indicate that the detection system can detects the DDoS backscatter with
high detection rate within a short time.
Table 1.3 shows the previous works on DDoS attack detection system which
uses di®erent approaches than the proposed system in this study, as an overview
to the existing method by the other researchers.
1.7 Performance Evaluations
The accuracy rate is a standard measure to evaluate the performance of a
classi¯er for a balance dataset. However, in this study, the data from one of two
classes is exceeded the number of the other class. Besides that, it is important
to evaluate the performance regarding the capability of the classi¯er to classify
correctly the positive class (malicious email or DDoS backscatter) and at the
same time able to di®erentiate the negative class (non-malicious email or non-
backscatter). Thus, it is not appropriate to evaluate the detection of the proposed
detection system using the accuracy rate alone. Therefore, in this study, four
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Table 1.4 The notation of TP, FP, FN and FP.
True class label
Malicious Non-malicious
Malicious TP FP
P
re
d
ic
te
d
Non-malicious FN FP
evaluations are used which are: accuracy rate, recall rate, precision rate and F1
measure rate. The evaluations can be calculated as follow:
Accuracy rate =
TP + TN
P +N
(1.6)
Recall rate =
TP
TP + FN
(1.7)
Precision rate =
TP
TP + FP
(1.8)
F1 measure = 2:
P recision : Recall
Precision+Recall
(1.9)
where the de¯nition of True Positive (TP), False Positive (FP), False Negative
(FN) and False Positive (TN) are simpli¯ed in Table 1.4.
The experiments are carried out on a personal computer with Intel Core Quad
(3.4 GHz) CPU and 32 GB main memory. To evaluate the learning time, the
computational costs are estimated based on the actual learning time measured
by the Matlab stopwatch timer function.
1.8 Thesis Outlines and Research Objectives
The main purpose of this dissertation is to solve the classi¯cation problem
of large-scale stream data which focus on cybersecurity application. In order
to ensure fast and accurate learning, the data selection mechanism should be
introduced into a classi¯er model to ¯nd such essential data from a given chunk
of data.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
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Chapter 2: A Fast Online Learning Algorithm of Radial Basis Func-
tion Network with Locality Sensitive Hashing
This chapter contains related works on RAN and the proposed classi¯er model
which is the extended RAN classi¯er embedded with LSH-based data selection
and RBF bases selection namely RAN-LSH. RAN-LSH is able to accelerate the
learning time and it is suitable to be used in large-scale stream data processing.
Chapter 3: An Online Malicious Spam Email Detection System Us-
ing Resource Allocating Network with Locality Sensitive Hashing32)
This chapter contains related works on double-bounce email and the proposed
detection system which is malicious spam email detection system. This detection
system uses RAN-LSH classi¯er with outlier detection. It is able to learn quickly
and also capable to reduce the number of training data that need to be labeled
using SPIKE system by introducing outlier detection.
Chapter 4: Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Backscatter Detec-
tion System Using Resource Allocating Network with Data Selection33)
This chapter contains related work on darknet and the proposed detection system
which is DDoS backscatter detection system. The RAN-LSH classi¯er uses an
improved condition to select essential data. This detection system is capable to
select a small number of essential data compared to previous RAN-LSH.
Chapter 5: Conclusions
This chapter contains the summary of the dissertation and future works of this
study.
The objectives of each chapter and overall network structure of proposed system
are shown by Table 1.5 and Fig. 1.6, respectively.
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Figure 1.6 The overall network structure of proposed model.
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Chapter 2
Propose Method: A Fast Online Learning
Algorithm of Radial Basis Function Network
with Locality Sensitive Hashing
2.1 Introduction
Due to the recent development of computer networks and sensor technologies,
many application software and devices (e.g. www, twitter, surveillance camera)
keep generating large-scale and high-dimensional data continuously as a stream.
There are at least two major issues to be solved: (1) how to handle the growing
number of data while maintaining high-performance, and (2) how to adapt to
dynamic environment quickly. The ¯rst issue can be solved by learning only im-
portant information incrementally34). On the other hand, for the second issue, the
computational time needs to be reduced by removing unimportant calculations
in the learning.
For the incremental learning algorithm, an extended version of modi¯ed RAN
classi¯er12) is proposed in which LSH is used to select data and active RBF
centers. RAN with local learning (i.e., learning only active RBF centers) can
e®ectively suppress the so-called catastrophic forgetting35) by learning some RBF
centers with a given training data. However, the learning could be problematic
if many data are provided to learn at the same time. In order to ensure real-
time incremental learning, a mechanism to select and learn only essential data is
solicited in modi¯ed RAN. For this purpose, a margin-based data selection has
often been adopted in neural networks. In this approach, a training data is given
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to a neural classi¯er and the margins of the two largest outputs are calculated,
and then only data with small margins are selected to learn. However, the com-
putational costs to calculate output margins are generally expensive, especially
when a large number of data are given as a continuous data sequence.
One way to alleviate the computational burden in the data selection is that the
margin calculation is restricted only for training data in \untrained" and \not
well-trained" regions. To specify such regions with less computation, LSH4, 5, 6, 7, 8)
is adopted. With LSH, the region of a given training data is quickly speci¯ed by
transforming into a hash value and the learning status for the speci¯ed region is
checked in a hash table. If the region is judged as \untrained", the training data
would be selected to learn; otherwise, it would be discarded. Since the calcula-
tion of hash values in LSH is generally much smaller than that of output margin,
the data selection is expected to be fast by using LSH. The idea of using LSH
can also be applied to the selection of active RBF units. Since the learning time
strongly depends on the number of RBF units17) in modi¯ed RAN, if only RBF
units with high activations are selected, the learning of connection weights would
be signi¯cantly faster. For this purpose, LSH is adopted again to ¯nd active
RBF units quickly; that is, instead of calculating RBF activations, active RBF
units are searched by calculating the LSH distances between the hash values of
an input and all RBF centers.
There have been several relevant studies on incremental learning with data
selection which have been proposed using di®erent types of classi¯ers such Sup-
port Vector Machines (SVM)36, 37, 38) and neuro-fuzzy inference system39). One
of adaptive SVM for classi¯cation is proposed in36) which not only presented data
selection in the incremental SVM, but also able to adapt the SVM to changes in
regularization and kernel parameters. The training data are partitioned into three
following categories: the set which strictly on the margin, exceeding the margin
and within the margin, namely margin support vectors, error support vectors and
reserve vectors, respectively. Based on this approach, the margin support vectors
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and error support vectors are used for learning, whereas the reserve vectors are
discarded from training data. With the same approach, Diehl et. al. conducted
numerical experiments on Pima Indian dataset regarding regularization param-
eter C and kernel parameter sigma. In addition to works by Cauwenberghs et
al.36) and Diehl et al.37), SpÄuler et al.38) provides multiclass classi¯cation task and
uses Platt's probabilistic output to ensure high probability of predicting the test
data correctly, based on studies in40, 41), respectively.
More recently, Subramaniam et al.39) proposed a metacognitive neuro-fuzzy
inference system in which employs a quite similar categorization of training data.
In the study, a training data is assigned to either of three following learning
strategies: sample deletion, sample learning and sample reserve. The training
data are categorized as sample deletion when the data are correctly classi¯ed
and the estimated posterior probability of the class is above a certain threshold.
Since the knowledge has already presented, thus these data are discarded and
not used for learning. On the other hand, when training data are misclassi¯ed,
the data fall into sample learning category. In this category, it is obvious that
the system needs to allocate a new rule or update the parameter of the rules or
to remove redundant rules, so that the data are able to be classi¯ed correctly.
If these misclassi¯ed data do not ful¯ll either one of rule growing conditions or
parameter update conditions, the data would be reserved for learning at later
learning stages.
Although the previous studies mentioned above have utilize the data selection
mechanism to discard training data that are classi¯ed correctly, to the best of my
knowledge, the case of treating the training data as multiple groups of similar
data has not been given great attention by the researchers in the past and this
motivated the present study. In previous studies, the training data is treated
as individual data when assigning category to be learned or not. However, in
my approach, the training data are ¯rstly grouped into similar data where the
condition of the data whether well-learned or not well-learned is decided by the
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°ag given by margin °ag item in hash table, without repeatedly calculating the
condition's equation. Thus, it is expected that the proposed method is able to
shorten more learning time instead of only removing unimportant training data.
In this chapter, a fast learning algorithm of modi¯ed RAN is proposed which
consists of the following two mechanisms: the LSH-based data selection and the
LSH-based RBF selection. With the former mechanism, even if a large chunk of
training data is given, only essential data are trained in modi¯ed RAN. With the
latter mechanism, even if the number of RBF units becomes large, the learning
time is expected to be fairly constant because the number of selected RBF units
are limited to the near RBF. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2
presents its extended model, in which the data selection and the RBF selection are
implemented by using LSH. In Section 2.3, the performance of the proposed model
is evaluated for several benchmark datasets in the University of California, Irvine
(UCI) Machine Learning Repository. Finally, Section 2.4 gives the conclusions of
this work.
2.2 The proposed LSH-Based Data Selection and RBF
Bases Selection
2.2.1 Learning Algorithm
Only a limited number of training data is assumed available in the initial learn-
ing phase. These initial training data are used to decide the structure of a learning
model and to set up its appropriate parameters. On the other hand, in the in-
cremental learning phase, it is assumed that a large set of training data are given
sequentially and it is too large to learn all data at every time step.
Under such learning environments, training data to be learned in the incremen-
tal learning mode should be restricted to only essential ones such as those existing
in untrained regions or data that are \not well-trained". For this purpose, the
margin-based data selection42) can be used to evaluate the status of each training
data given, whether they are \well-trained" or not. However, to introduce this
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Figure 2.1 Network Structure of RAN-LSH.
margin-based method in modi¯ed RAN, the output margins must be calculated
for all training data. Obviously, it requires expensive computations for the data
selection, and it makes di±cult for modi¯ed RAN to learn a large data chunk in
real time.
To select untrained data from a chunk of given data quickly, LSH is introduced
in the data selection. Figure 2.1 illustrates the proposed model called RAN with
LSH-based Data Selection (RAN-LSH) and Algorithm 2 shows the main °ows of
the RAN-LSH learning. As seen in Fig. 2.1, RAN-LSH is composed of two parts:
(a) LSH-based data selection and (b) RAN classi¯er. The learning is divided
into the following two phases: initial learning phase (Algorithms 2 Lines 1-2)
and incremental learning phase (Algorithms 2 Lines 3-10). As mentioned above,
in the initial learning phase, only a limited number of data are assumed to be
given. They are used to get proper values of the RBF width ¾2 and the number of
partitions P , and to create an initial hash table H (see Line 1 in both Algorithms
2 and 3).
After the initialization, the learning mode is changed to incremental learning.
Whenever a new chunk of data is given, it is ¯rst forwarded to LSH to calculate a
hash value. After updating the hash table, the chunk of data is sent to the data
selection part to select only essential data from the given chunk X. In order to
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make the learning of RAN-LSH faster, a local learning algorithm is adopted in
which only a limited number of active RBF units are selected by using LSH and
their connection weights are trained incrementally (see Fig. 2.1). Since the time
complexity of learning connection weights in modi¯ed RAN is the order O(J3)
(J : the number of RBF units)17), it is expected that the proposed local learning
algorithm would also contribute to reducing the learning time in RAN-LSH. These
steps are summarized in Algorithm 2 (RAN-LSH learning algorithm).
The detailed procedures in the LSH-based data selection and the whole learning
algorithm of RAN-LSH are explained in the following sections.
2.2.2 LSH-based Data Selection
The LSH-based data selection is carried out based on a hash table H which
consists of the following three items: hash value h(x), prototype vector ¹x and
margin °ag FM . A hash function is used to encode an input data into a hash
value as an index in the hash table. In LSH, input data that exist within a local
region are encoded into the same hash value43). A prototype vector corresponds
to a typical input data (e.g., mean vector) which represents a local region, and the
margin °ag means the learning status of the local region: trained or untrained.
Since the proposed LSH-based data selection is carried out under an incremen-
tal learning environment, the hash table H in the proposed method should be
updated on an online basis. For this purpose, the LSH method used here has the
following di®erences from the conventional projection-based implementations of
LSH proposed by Andoni et. al.5):
(1) A hash functionHi is de¯ned as the projection to an eigenvector obtained by
Principal Component Analysis (PCA), instead of that to a random vector.
(2) Only one hash table H is used and H is evolved in both size and contents
to adapt to time-varying data distributions; that is, the entries in H is
increased in number and updated online. Therefore, it is unlikely that H
covers all areas of an input space, although it may end up covering the
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whole space for a long run.
In the next subsections, let us give detailed explanations on the hash encoding,
how to update a hash table and the propose data selection algorithm.
Hash Encoding
The basic idea of LSH is to hash high-dimensional input data so that similar
data are mapped to the same buckets (subregions of inputs) with high proba-
bility. Here, a projection-based LSH is adopted, in which the projection in a
hash encoding is conducted for eigenvectors obtained by PCA, instead of random
vectors. It is well known that an eigen-subspace spanned by such eigenvectors
gives a good approximation to an input space and its approximation error can
be easily controlled by the accumulation ratio, which is de¯ned by the ratio of
input components in the approximated subspace over those in the whole input
space. Therefore, by introducing eigenvectors instead of random vectors in the
projection-based LSH, a suitable number of hash functions can be easily deter-
mined from a given data distribution.
Let l be the number of eigenvectors which are obtained by setting the threshold
µa for the accumulation ratio; that is, l is given as the minimum number of
eigenvectors whose accumulation ratio is larger than or equal to the threshold
µa. In addition, let the obtained eigenvectors be U l = fu1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ;ulg. Then, a
projection vector V = fv1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; vlgT of an input data x is obtained by
V = UTl x: (2.1)
In the proposed hash encoding, each projection vi (i = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; l) is divided into
P partitions along the one-dimensional space spanned by the eigenvector ui. Let
H(vi) be a hash function that transforms vi into an l-series of hash value: H(vi)
2 f1; : : : ; Pgli=1, and let v¡i and v+i be the lower and upper values of typical
projections vi on the ith eigenvector ui, respectively. In the proposed RAN-LSH,
v+i and v
¡
i are determined in the initial learning phase (see Algorithm 3 Line 5),
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and they are de¯ned as the minimum and maximum values of the projections for
initial training data X0. The hash function H(vi) is given as follow:
H(vi) = max
½»
minfmaxfvi; v¡i g; v+i g ¡ v¡i
v+i ¡ v¡i
P
¼
; 1
¾
: (2.2)
Therefore, a hash value h(x) is de¯ned as the following decimal code, which is
given by concatenating all the decimal codes of a hash function H(vi):
h(x) = fH(v1); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; H(vl)g (2.3)
as such, an input x is encoded into an l-series of decimal hash vector.
Update of Hash Table
As seen in Algorithm 2 Line 5, the hash values of training dataX are ¯rst calcu-
lated, andX is rede¯ned by adding the hash values h(xi): X^ = f(xi;di;h(xi))gNd0i=1.
Then, a hash table H is updated with the newly de¯ned training data X^. Al-
gorithm 4 shows how to update a hash table H with X^. In the following, let us
assume that a hash table has NH entries (i.e., H = fHegNHe=1) and the eth entry He
is represented by a triplet He = fh(¹xe); ¹xe; FMe g where ¹xe, h(¹xe), and FMe are a
prototype vector, its decimal hash encoding, and the margin °ag, respectively.
For each training data in X^, the following procedures are carried out. First,
a hash value h(xi) is searched from H. If h(xi) is matched with h(¹xe) in H, it
implies that the neighbor area around xi has already been learned. In this case,
the prototype vector ¹xe is updated with xi as follow:
¹x0e =
1
N + 1
(N ¹xe + xi) : (2.4)
If the margin °ag FMe = 0, the output margin should be checked for the updated
prototype ¹x0e using Eq. (1.5). Then, the margin °ag F
M
e is updated as follow:
FMe =
8<: 0 (¢z(¹x0e) · µm)1 (otherwise) (2.5)
where µm is a positive threshold.
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If there is no matched entry in H, it implies that a training data xi has not
been learned so far. Thus, the output margin for xi need to be calculated, so that
a margin °ag would be assigned for the new entry. Then, a new entry HNH+1 is
created in H as follow: HNH+1 = fh(xi);xi; FMNH+1g.
Data Selection
Algorithm 5 shows the steps to select essential data. In the data selection, the
hash value for each data is examined (see also the upper left of Fig. 2.1(a)). If
the margin °ag FMe is `0', it implies that a training data exists in an untrained
region; thus, such a training data should be selected and learned by RAN. On
the other hand, if the margin °ag FMe is `1', it implies that the neighbor region
of such a training data is well trained. Therefore, such a data is not considered
to be essential for RAN, and it can be discarded to reduce the learning time.
2.2.3 LSH-based RBF Selection
As mentioned before in Section 1.3.1, RBF bases in hidden layer are used to
suppress the interference e®ectively. However, it is not e±cient to retrieve and
train all RBF bases. One of the reason is the calculation of the SVD in Eq. (1.4)
would become heavier for a larger number of hidden units as such, if all RBF
centers are used to update the weight. Thus, the processing time would require
a longer time. Therefore, the RBF bases are restricted to learn only near RBF
centers, in which must satisfy a speci¯c condition (i.e. LSH distance d¤j · µp).
The algorithm to retrieve only a part of RBF bases is shown in Algorithm 6.
In this study, LSH distance with decimal hash code is adopted, instead of the
well-known Hamming distance of binary hash code. This is because, the Hamming
distance of binary values is only appropriate to measure distance of projection
vector V which is divided into at most three partitions. If larger number of
partitions is used, the Hamming distance value would not represents the distance
correctly. For example, in the case of P = 8, 3-bits binary would be used to
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Table 2.1 Hash Table
Index h(xe) f1, 2, 3g f2, 2, 2g f2, 4, 4g
Prototype xe x1 (x2+x3)/2 x4
Margin Flag FMe 1 1 0
represent each segment/bucket where vl is located (i.e. segment 2 f1; : : : ; Pg).
Let say segment = 5 and segment = 6 are represented by binary code 011b
and 100b respectively. When the Hamming distance between these segments are
calculated, it would give 3-bit di®erence instead of 1-bit di®erence. Since in this
study number of partitions larger than three is used, it is inappropriate to use
binary hash code and Hamming distance to ¯nd near RBFs.
To ¯nd the RBFs neighbor of a training data using LSH, ¯rstly, the hash values
of RBFs need to be retrieved from the constructed hash table H where the Cjth
entries in H are correspond to the hash values of the jth RBFs. Next, the LSH
distance d¤j for each jth RBFs can be calculated as follows;
d¤j = h(x)¡ h(cj)
=
lX
i=1
³¯¯¯
H(vx i)¡H(vcj i)
¯¯¯´
: (2.6)
where the distance (using hash values in decimal) between a given training data
h(xi) and all RBF centers h(ci) for l-projection vector in V are accumulated.
Then the RBF centers with LSH distances that are less or equal to µp would be
selected to solve the linear equation in Eq. (1.4).
To explain the LSH-based data selection and LSH-based RBF bases selection
steps using dummy dataset, Figs. 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 are used. The elaboration of
hash encoding, creating hash table, selecting data based on LSH and selecting
near RBF bases based on LSH are summarized in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.3 Evaluated UCI Datasets.
Dataset #Init. Data #Train. Data #Test Data #Attrib. #Classes
Hiragana 500 8366 8365 13 38
Adult 500 22611 22611 14 2
Shuttle 500 28989 28988 9 5
Bank 500 22606 22605 16 2
Pendigits 500 5496 5496 16 10
Letter 500 10000 10000 16 26
MAGIC 500 9510 9510 10 2
Optical Digits 281 2810 2810 64 10
Semeion 80 797 796 256 10
2.3 Performance Evaluation
2.3.1 Experimental Setup
To evaluate the performance of the proposed method, the nine benchmark
datasets in the UCI Machine Learning Repository44) are used. The dataset infor-
mation is shown in Table 2.3. Although training and test data are separately pro-
vided in some data sets, they are merged and randomly divided into two subsets
to evaluate the average performance through the two-fold cross-validation. Since
the performance generally depends on the sequence of training data, 30 sequences
in total are trained incrementally and the average performance is evaluated for
the test data. For the ¯rst seven datasets in Table 2.3, 500 initial training data
are randomly selected from the training data. For the other datasets (Optical
Digits and Semeion), 10% of the training data are randomly selected as initial
data. After the initial learning, it is assumed that a large chunk of data is given
sequentially in the incremental learning phase. The number of data in a chunk is
set to 1,000 at every learning stage except for the last stage. Since training data
are assumed to be given only once, the data chunk given at the last stage may
consist of less than 1,000 data.
In the following experiments, the proposed RAN-LSH are evaluated from the
following three points: (1) appropriateness of the granularity in the hash encod-
ing, (2) e®ectiveness of the data selection, and (3) the e®ectiveness of the local
learning in modi¯ed RAN. For the notational convenience, let us denote modi¯ed
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RAN with the margin-based data selection as RAN-MRG.
In RAN-LSH, the three parameters on accumulation ratio µa, output margin µm,
and tolerant distance µp should be determined empirically. In this experiment,
the following parameter settings are used: µa = 0:7, µm = 0:05, and µp = 3.
Meanwhile, the error threshold " is set to 0.5. The other parameters, RBF width
¾ and the number of partitions P , are determined in the initial learning phase
through the cross-validation.
2.3.2 Granularity in Hash Encoding
To avoid unnecessary calculations of output margins in the data selection,
similar data are associated with the same partition to represent the learning
status (i.e., well-trained or untrained). As easily expected, if the number of
partitions is small, a state space is roughly represented in the hash encoding and
the collision probability of dissimilar data tends to be high. On the contrary,
if the number of partitions is large, the collision probability would be low (i.e.,
data are sparsely allocated to each segment/bucket of P partition), while the
size of a hash table would be large, resulting in the increase of the memory and
computational costs.
To ¯nd a suitable granularity in the hash encoding (i.e., a proper number of
partitions P ), let us introduce the following Davies-Bouldin index IDB
45):
IDB =
1
P
PX
i=1
max
j:i6=j
Si + Sj
k¹xi ¡ ¹xjk (2.7)
where ¹xi and Si are the centroid and the variance of data allocated to the ith-
segment of P partition, respectively. The numerator in Eq. (2.7) corresponds to
the within-cluster scatter for the segments i and j, which should be as small as
possible. The denominator corresponds to the between-cluster separation between
the centroids ¹xi and ¹xj. This Davies-Bouldin index IDB depends on the data as
well as the hash encoding method, and ideally has to be as small as possible.
However, as mentioned above, too small IDB leads to the sparse data allocation
42
Davies-Bouldin 
        index
Memory 
   [kB]
Davies-Bouldin 
        index
Memory 
   [MB]
Davies-Bouldin 
        index
Memory 
   [MB]
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 1.4
 2  4  8 16  32  64
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
900
Number of partitions
Davies-Bouldin index
Memory
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2 4  8  16  32  64
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 3.5
 4
 4.5
Number of partitions
Davies-Bouldin index
Memory
PendigitsShuttle
MAGIC  
    
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 1.4
 1.6
 1.8
 2  4  8  16  32  64
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
Number of partitions
Davies-Bouldin index
Memory
Figure 2.5 E®ect of the number of partitions P to the Davies-Bouldin index
IDB and the memory consumption for (a) Shuttle, (b) Pendigits, and (c) MAGIC
datasets.
in the hash encoding and results in the increase in computation and memory costs.
Therefore, a proper value of P is needed to be determined such that a moderate
value of IDB with less memory and computational costs can be obtained.
Figure 2.5 illustrates IDB and the memory size for di®erent numbers of parti-
tions P . Shuttle, Pendigits and MAGIC Gamma Telescope (MAGIC) datasets
are used for the evaluation. As seen in Fig. 2.5, when P increases, IDB decreases;
that is, the collision probability of dissimilar data is getting low. In contrast,
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Table 2.4 E®ect of the number of partitions P to learning time [sec.]
Methods Shuttle Pendigits MAGIC
RAN-MRG 1.6§0.4 1.2§0.1 13.8§1.7
RAN-LSH (P = 2) 0.6§0 0.3§0.1 0.3§0.2
RAN-LSH (P = 4) 1.0§0.1 0.9§0.1 4.4§0.8
RAN-LSH (P = 8) 1.0§0.1 1.4§0.1 10.0§1.6
RAN-LSH (P = 16) 1.0§0.1 1.6§0.1 14.4§1.9
RAN-LSH (P = 32) 1.3§0.2 1.6§0.1 14.7§1.8
RAN-LSH (P = 64) 3.3§0.5 2.2§0.1 16.5§1.7
the required memory size is increased due to the increase in the number of hash
entries. Meanwhile, Table 2.4 shows the learning time for di®erent numbers of
partitions. Obviously, when the number of partitions increases, the time for in-
cremental learning becomes long.
From the results in Fig. 2.5 and Table 2.4, one can say that an optimal value of
P exists between 4 and 16. Therefore, let us ¯nd a suitable number of partitions
P within this range by applying the cross-validation to an initial dataset.
2.3.3 E®ectiveness of Data Selection
To see the e®ectiveness of the data selection in RAN-LSH, the e®ectiveness of
the proposed model to ¯nd similar data is investigated using CIFAR-10 dataset.
CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 32x32 colour images of ten di®erent classes which
are horse, airplane, car, bird, cat, dog, frog, ship, truck and deer. It is sensible to
use this dataset because the strength of the proposed method to gather similar
data in the same classes as one group and avoid grouping di®erent classes into
a same group is able to be shown, although the data is almost similar such as
dog and cat classes. Figure 2.6 illustrates the ¯rst 13 images which are sorted in
descending order, from the most similar to the most not similar data. We can
see that LSH-based data selection which embedded in RAN-LSH classi¯er, not
only capable to group similar data in a same group, but also showed that most
of these similar data is grouped according to their correct classes. This result
has proven that the PCA projection-based LSH is su±cient to ¯nd similar data
e®ectively.
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Figure 2.6 The e®ectiveness of selecting similar data using CIFAR-10 dataset.
Besides that, the performance of the model is compared with the other two
modi¯ed RAN models, in which no data selection mechanism is introduced (RAN
model) and a margin-based data selection is introduced (RAN-MRG model). Ta-
ble 2.5 shows the results of the performance comparison based on the following
measures: (a) the ¯nal recognition accuracy [%], (b) learning time [sec.], and (c)
the total number of selected data. The ¯nal recognition accuracy is examined for
the test dataset after the incremental learning phase is completed, and the learn-
ing time only includes the computational time for incremental learning. These
results are averaged over 30 trials with di®erent data sequences. Each results are
represented in the form of (average) § (standard deviation). The single asterisk
(*) and the double asterisk (**) mean that the average di®erence against modi¯ed
RAN (no data selection) is statistically signi¯cant under p-value is less than 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
As seen in Table 2.5(a), the recognition accuracies of RAN-MRG and RAN-
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Table 2.5 E®ectiveness of introducing the data selection. The performance is
compared among three models; modi¯ed RAN, RAN-MRG and RAN-LSH, re-
garding (a) the ¯nal recognition accuracy [%], (b) learning time [sec.], and (c)
the total number of selected data. Note that modi¯ed RAN has no data selection
mechanism.
(a) Recognition accuracy [%]
Dataset RAN RAN-MRG RAN-LSH
Shuttle 98.4§1.8 98:9§ 1:1 98:6§ 0:9
Pendigits 98.9§0.2 98:3§ 0:3¤¤ 98:3§ 0:3¤¤
MAGIC 76.5§0.8 74:6§ 2:1¤¤ 75:1§ 2:1¤
(b) Learning time [sec.]
Dataset RAN RAN-MRG RAN-LSH
Shuttle 151.2§20.7 1:6§ 0:4¤¤ 1:3§ 0:5¤¤
Pendigits 134.7§9.8 1:9§ 0:1¤¤ 1:7§ 0:1¤¤
MAGIC 10,808§809 18:8§ 1:7¤¤ 16:2§ 2:2¤¤
(c) Total number of selected data
Dataset RAN RAN-MRG RAN-LSH
Shuttle 28,488 216§ 101¤¤ 95§ 28¤¤
Pendigits 4,996 67§ 8¤¤ 57§ 10¤¤
MAGIC 9,010 380§ 27¤¤ 249§ 30¤¤
LSH are slightly dropped compared with that of modi¯ed RAN because many
training data are discarded in the data selection (see Table 2.5(c)). For Shuttle,
only 0.3% of training data are used for learning in RAN-LSH on average. Thus,
99.7% training data are discarded by the proposed LSH-based data selection,
although the performance seems to be relatively decreased by 0.1%. On the
other hand, although small performance drops are recognized for Pendigits and
MAGIC, the percentages of the data reduction are 98.9% and 97.2%, respectively.
Obviously, this data reduction results in signi¯cant speed-up in learning (see Table
2.5(b)). Compared with RAN-MRG, the proposed RAN-LSH can reduce more
training data without deteriorating the recognition accuracy. Therefore, it can
be concluded that the proposed LSH-based data selection works properly.
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Figure 2.7 E®ect of RBF bases selection with di®erent µp. Best viewed in color.
2.3.4 The E®ect of RBF Bases Selection and Comparison to State-of-
the-Art Method
To investigate the e±ciency of RAN-LSH with RBF selection, two observa-
tions are carried out as follows: (1) identify the e®ect of selecting RBF bases
using di®erent values of µp, and (2) examine the performance regarding (a) the
recognition accuracy and (b) learning time. Figure 2.7 and Table 2.6 show the
above ¯ndings respectively. Besides that, in this subsection, a state-of-the-art
approach incremental SVM with data selection is being compared with the pro-
posed method as the baseline of the ¯ndings. To the best of my knowledge, there
are some SVM algorithms which support incremental learning36, 37, 38). However,
in36, 37), the incremental SVM does not support multiclass classi¯cation. Then,
the method that can handle multiclass classi¯cation with data selection is cho-
sen. The results to compare the proposed method with incremental SVM in38) is
included in Table 4.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the e®ects of using di®erent values of µp towards number
of RBFs selected for two datasets (a) Optical Digits and (b) Semeion. In Fig. 2.7
(without RBFs selection), it can be seen that the number of RBF bases increases
gradually in proportion to the number of training data. As previously stated
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Table 2.6 The e®ect of selecting RBF centers using di®erent threshold values µp
namely through; (a) recognition accuracy [%], (b) incremental learning time [s],
and (c) the total number of RBF bases selected. The values represented are the
mean and standard deviation of each method.
(a) Recognition accuracy [%]
Dataset RAN-MRG RAN-LSH RAN-LSH RAN-LSH Adaptive
µp =1 µp = 10 µp = 3 SVM
Hiragana 96.8§0.4 96.6§0.4 96.8§0.4 96.7§0.4 97.2§0.7
Adult 78.1§1.2 78.0§1.2 78.1§1.0 77.8§1.3 75.2§0.2
Shuttle 98.9§1.1 98.6§0.9 98.3§1.4 98.1§1.3 94.9§0.1
Bank 84.1§1.8 84.4§1.7 83.9§1.9 84.6§1.5 88.3§0.2
Pendigits 98.3§0.3 98.3§0.3 98.3§0.3 97.8§0.4 97.6§1.6
Letter 86.6§0.5 86.4§0.5 86.5§0.5 86.4§0.8 86.5§1.0
MAGIC 74.6§2.1 75.1§2.1 75.7§1.8 73.9§2.0 68.9§5.4
Optical Digits 97.7§0.5 97.7§0.5 97.7§0.5 97.7§0.5 98.2§0.9
Semeion 90.4§0.1 90.4§0.1 90.4§0.1 90.4§0.1 85.1§15.1
(b) Incremental learning time [sec.]
Dataset RAN-MRG RAN-LSH RAN-LSH RAN-LSH Adaptive
µp =1 µp = 10 µp = 3 SVM
Hiragana 48.0§4.5 42.9§4.0 10.5§1.6 7.4§1.1 288.4§9.8
Adult 102.4§10.8 90.1§9.0 30.0§6.2 14.9§2.6 23.2§2.1
Shuttle 1.6§0.4 1.3§0.5 1.2§0.5 1.2§0.4 281.2§0.1
Bank 17.3§1.7 15.7§1.8 15.2§1.9 6.8§1.0 38.3§40.6
Pendigits 1.9§0.1 1.7§0.1 1.0§0.0 0.9§0.0 36.8§3.5
Letter 218.1§13.8 179.0§16.4 156.0§8.9 8.5§0.3 338.7§69.7
MAGIC 18.8§1.7 16.2§2.2 4.5§0.8 2.6§0.3 28.9§24.2
Optical Digits 65.8§3.2 63.2§2.9 18.2§2.4 9.3§4.3 20.9§0.5
Semeion 124.5§1.2 121.9§3.1 8.9§1.2 4.1§0.6 10.6§0.6
(c) Total number of RBF bases
Dataset RAN-MRG RAN-LSH RAN-LSH RAN-LSH Adaptive
µp =1 µp = 10 µp = 3 SVM
Hiragana 559.9§17.5 557.7§16.8 575.0§19.0 572.2§19.1 -
Adult 670.2§21.0 688.0§23.8 757.3§54.0 608.4§19.6 -
Shuttle 97.0§5.1 56.5§10.6 60.1§14.7 53.9§10.4 -
Bank 274.1§15.2 277.2§16.4 273.6§17.3 268.1§40.9 -
Pendigits 176.6§6.7 176.7§6.7 176.2§6.7 159.4§6.5 -
Letter 818.6§16.4 817.2§13.9 814.9§15.2 832.2§32.3 -
MAGIC 352.6§13.4 374.1§13.8 401.7§28.7 333.7§11.9 -
Optical Digits 727.4§10.4 727.9§10.1 727.7§10.2 728.3§10.3 -
Semeion 792.1§2.1 792.1§2.1 792.1§2.1 792.1§2.1 -
in Algorithm 1, the RBF center would be added if the current model is not
well-trained and thus RAN-LSH model without RBFs selection is not suitable
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for large-scale data sequences. This is because the learning time would take an
eternity to update the weights of a very large RBF outputs matrix ©. As a result,
the model could not catch up with the speed of the next data chunk. However,
the in°uence of expansion on hidden units' size can reduced by learning only RBF
bases which are located near to the training data.
Learning a training sample along with near RBF bases could prevent catas-
trophic forgetting in the incremental learning. However, learning all RBF bases
would cause a new interference due to the distribution of the RBF bases that
is sparsely distributed. One of the RBF bases selection strategy is to choose
the active RBFs using Euclidean distance. Conversely, in the proposed method's
approach, the LSH distance is used to choose RBF bases that are near to the
given training data. In this present study, µp is used to select the maximum LSH
distance between a training data and all RBF centers in the hidden layer nodes.
When a small value of µp is used, only a small area of the near RBF bases to a
training data is involved and thus a few RBF centers would be selected and used
to update the weights. Meanwhile, when µp approached 1, RAN-LSH model
would act as such there is no RBF bases selection since the area of the nearest
RBF centers would cover almost all regions in the input space. The advantage
of this approach is shown through this experiment in that; it selects only one
nearest RBF bases during learning by using µp = 3, thus enabling this model to
learn a large-scale data sequence in high-speed.
By selecting near RBF, it is assumed that the active RBF bases would be se-
lected to be learned together with a training data. To evaluate the performance
of the proposed method, the performance of the following four models are com-
pared: conventional RAN-MRG (without RBFs selection), RAN-LSH without
RBFs selection (µp = 1), RAN-LSH with RBFs selection using µp = 10 and
RAN-LSH that selects the nearest RBFs (µp = 3). Nine UCI datasets are used
to evaluate the performance of these models.
Table 2.6 demonstrates (a) the ¯nal recognition accuracy, (b) the incremental
49
learning time and (c) the ¯nal number of RBF bases created. In Table 2.6 (a)
and (c), for RAN-LSH with µ =1 (without RBF selection) model, it can be seen
that the LSH-based data selection is comparable to the conventional margin-based
data selection. This can be justi¯ed from the ¯ndings of recognition accuracy and
¯nal number of RBF bases created that are almost similar. Nevertheless, RAN-
LSH with µ = 1 is capable to speed up the learning where all datasets show a
time reduction during learning.
To shorten more learning time in RAN-LSH, the locally learning model (RAN-
LSH with RBF selection) is adopted. Local RAN-LSH model can avoid the high
computional of SVD calculation because only a few RBFs in the hidden layer are
selected to update the weight. For RAN-LSH with µp = 10 model, the recognition
accuracy and the ¯nal number of RBF bases are able to be maintained as previ-
ously models, RAN-MRG and RAN-LSH without RBF selection. Furthermore,
the incremental learning time is successfully reduced to 35% of the incremental
learning in RAN-MRG on average for ¯ve datasets which are Hiragana, Adult,
MAGIC, Optical Digits and Semeion datasets using RAN-LSH (µp = 10) model.
On the other hand, RAN-LSH with µp = 3 is able to achieve at most 0.9% dif-
ference of recognition rate for Shuttle dataset compared to RAN-MRG. Whereas
for the other datasets, the recognition accuracy shows a di®erence of only 0.5%
or lower. This shows that it is su±cient to use only one nearest RBF center to be
learned together with a given training data. In term of incremental learning time
(see Table 2.6 (b)), six datasets, which are Hiragana, Adult, Letter, MAGIC,
Optical Digits and Semeion datasets would require only 20% of the incremental
learning in RAN-MRG on average, where 84.6%, 85.4%, 96.1%, 81.2%, 85.9%
and 96.7% of learning times are speeden up, respectively. Whereas, for Shuttle,
Bank and Pendigits datasets, at least 25% of the incremental learning time is
shortened compare to RAN-MRG. Another advantage of RAN-LSH with µp = 3
model is the ¯nal number of RBF bases shown to be lower than RAN-MRG for all
datasets except Hiragana, Letter and Optical Digits where an extra 20 RBF bases
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are created at most. This result indicates that for especially large scale dataset,
RAN-LSH using µp = 3 model can e®ectively be used to reduce the learning time
without sacri¯cing the recognition accuracy.
As shown in Table 4(a), the proposed method RAN-LSH µp = 3 achieved a
comparable accuracy rate as Adaptive SVM except for Bank dataset. On the
other hand, the learning time of Adaptive SVM is longer compared to RAN-LSH
with µp = 3 for all datasets. From Table 4(b), the learning time of RAN-LSH
with µp = 3 and that of Adaptive SVM for two classes datasets (i.e., Adult, Bank
and MAGIC) do not have signi¯cant di®erence. RAN-LSH can learn one to
eleven times faster than Adaptive SVM. On the other hand, for the datasets with
more than two classes, the proposed method can learn quite faster than Adaptive
SVM. This ¯nding here appear to support the weakness of SVM classi¯er that
is originally designed to handle two classes problem or binary classi¯cation46).
To facilitate the multiclass classi¯cation using SVM, one of suggested approach
is \one-against-all" approach. However, using this approach it is obvious that
the learning time of SVM is increased due to these looping. Thus, it can be
concluded that RAN-LSH can learn faster than SVM with comparable classi¯-
cation performance, especially for large number of training data and multiclass
problems.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, a fast incremental learning algorithm of modi¯ed RAN namely
RAN-LSH is proposed which can be used to select essential data and near RBF
bases. By utilizing this, the high cost for calculating high dimensional data can
be lowered, as the repetition of output margins and weights update calculations
are able to be avoided. In the present study, the LSH-based data selection and
LSH-based RBF selection are introduced in the modi¯ed RAN classi¯er to solve
two major issues in large-scale data sequences. Through the experiments, it is
shown that the proposed method of RAN-LSH with µp = 3 is capable to learn a
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large chunk of data within a short period of time. This can be seen when only
20% of RAN-MRG's learning time on average is used by the proposed method,
while keeping a similar accuracy rate to the conventional method.
Furthermore, the proposed learning scheme provides desirable characteristics
for large-scale data sequences application. First, the learning is conducted in
one-pass; which is only new training data would be used to be learned by the
classi¯er, whereas the previous training data were discarded after the learning.
This property is very important for learning large-scale data sequences where the
data are growing in size, thus it is nearly impossible to learn and store a massive
data without using one-pass learning. The other property is that the learning
time is fast although large data chunk are given in every learning stage. From
several experiments using nine datasets in the UCI Machine Learning Repository,
the proposed scheme is veri¯ed to has the above desired characteristics.
There still remains several open problems in the proposed RAN-LSH. It can
be seen that the fastest learning time is achieved by using LSH with two parti-
tions. However, the recognition accuracy is slightly reduced if a small number of
partitions is used. The reason is because the matrix of eigenvectors Ul are only
determined during the initial training and does not updated incrementally. An
alternative solution is to update eigenvectors Ul incrementally and adapt with
the most su±cient number of partition to assign the hash value. This can be at-
tained by introducing Incremental PCA (IPCA)47) into the proposed RAN-LSH
with two partitions. However, there is one problem for this. After updating hash
functions, the hash table should also be updated properly without unexpected
forgetting of the previous knowledge. If this problem is solved, it is expected that
the idea of fast processing for large-scale data sequences using LSH would work
faster.
The above issues are left as the future work.
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Chapter 3
An Online Malicious Spam Email Detection
System Using Resource Allocating Network
with Locality Sensitive Hashing
3.1 Introduction
Emails have become one of the most frequently used methods for cyber attacks.
The most worrying email-based attack is TME48, 49). In TME, attackers send ma-
licious emails to certain people targeted in an organization, such as executives of
large companies, high-ranking government personnel, military o±cials and even
famous researchers, in order for the attackers to obtain valuable con¯dential in-
formation and latest research of the targeted people. In TME, an email often
has an attachment with malicious codes that can be installed automatically upon
opening without the victims realizing it. In some cases, the victims' computer
will become the back door for the attackers who in turn have the authority to
enter the network of the targeted persons and thus steal con¯dential information.
Another typical email-based cyber attack is the malicious spam email attack,
which aims to spread numerous emails with Uniform Resource Locator (URL)
links leading to malicious websites. Previously, malicious codes were sent through
the attachment of such spam emails. However, many successful ¯lters have been
developed to detect malicious attachments. Thus, attackers are now turning to
malicious spam campaigns that attack using the links attached in the emails.
According to the Symantec annual report in 201450), about 87 percent of scanned
spam messages contained at least one URL hyperlink. Moreover, recent ¯ndings
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by Symantec51) show a sharp rise of emails containing malicious links, from 7%
in October 2014 to 41% in the following months. Apart from that, currently,
attackers also use more relevant email content48) that are speci¯c to their victims'
line of work, besides addressing the name of the recipient in the email body to
convince the victim that the email received is a normal email. For instance,
a fake email noti¯cation regarding a conference or journal targeted towards a
recipient with academic status, noti¯cations regarding false documents such as
telecommunication service bills, fax and voicemail in which the victims are given
a link to get more information51). This technique is called Social Engineering52),
which Hadnagy53) de¯nes as \The Art of Human Hacking". It becomes di±cult
for normal users to distinguish not only between non-malicious and malicious
spam emails but also spam email from normal emails.
The objective of this chapter is to detect the malicious spam emails so that gen-
eral users can be protected from being re-directed to malicious websites. For this
purpose, an autonomous online system is proposed for detecting malicious spam
emails. In general, it is not easy to collect spam emails from individual persons
because it is not usually permitted to access personal email spools. Therefore in
the proposed system, we collect double-bounce spam emails that are delivered to
unknown users. From the collected spam emails data, a classi¯er model is used
to learn and classify the malicious spam emails. The updated connection weights
of the classi¯er model are sent to a user's mailer software to improve the mali-
cious spam email detection ability. Jungsuk54) points out that the live period of
malicious URLs is often very short, usually within a few days; thus, it is expected
that introducing incremental learning to malicious spam email detection will be
e®ective. The system can learn from the recent spam emails so that the spam
email detection system is always up to date. On the other hand, spammers often
use botnets to spread spam emails. For example, a botnet called Rustock which
consists of approximately 1 million infected computers that networked together,
is capable of sending up to 30 billion spam emails every day55). Since the distri-
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bution of such spam emails is done in a short time, it is assumed that the spam
emails have the same or similar contents in general56). Hence, the LSH4, 5, 6, 7, 8)
is adopted to quickly select important training data to be learned. For this pur-
pose, RAN-LSH is adopted as a classi¯er model in the proposed detection system.
This model has the following two important properties: (1) the learning is carried
out incrementally, and (2) only data within an untrained region are selected and
learned even when a large amount of data is given.
This chapter is organized as follows. The proposed system for detecting mali-
cious spam emails is presented in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, the performance of
the spam email detection system is evaluated for a set of 20,448 double-bounce
emails collected from 1st March, 2013 to 10th May, 2013. Finally, conclusions
and future work are addressed in Section 3.4.
3.2 The Proposed Malicious Spam Email Detection Sys-
tem
3.2.1 System Architecture
Figure 3.1 illustrates the architecture of the proposed autonomous online ma-
licious spam email detection system57) which is composed of three components:
(1) autonomous spam email collection system, (2) text processing and feature
transformation, and (3) RAN-LSH classi¯er embedded with the data selection
and outlier detection mechanisms.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, learning all the given data is not a good strategy
under incremental learning environments because the learning may not be com-
pleted before a new data set is given58). To enhance the adaptibility to dynamic
environments, the learning should be carried out with essential data that are se-
lected in an online fashion. There are two types of essential data for a learning
purpose. The ¯rst type is the data located close to a class boundary59), while
the other is the data located outside of the learned region (i.e., outlier). In order
to ensure fast and accurate learning, the data selection mechanism should be in-
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Figure 3.1 Network structure of the proposed autonomous malicious spam email
detection system.
troduced into a classi¯er model to ¯nd such essential data from a given chunk of
data.
The ¯rst type of essential data has been discussed in Section 2.2. On the other
hand, the second type of essential data are selected by the outlier detection.
This type of essential data selection is introduced into the previous RAN-LSH
classi¯er. The outlier detection relies on the output margin and the number of
occurrence of similar data in the input space which are represented by outlier °ag
FOe .
In the following subsection, the details of ¯ve components' autonomous on-
line malicious spam email detection system are explained, which consists of
autonomous spam email collection system, autonomous labeling system, pre-
processing, outlier detection and RAN-LSH classi¯er. Algorithm 7 and Algorithm
8, summarized the steps to carry out the autonomous spam email detection sys-
tem and the pre-processing procedure of the system, respectively.
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3.2.2 Autonomous Spam Email Collection System
Figure 3.1(a) illustrates the process of obtaining double-bounce emails. Let us
consider a case that a spammer sends a large number of emails. In many cases,
almost all emails will reach existing users. However, it is very likely that some
email addresses are no longer in use for some reason. Therefore, the email server
would return such emails with unknown addresses to the sender. If the spammer
intends to send a malicious email, it is also likely that the spammer has faked
the originating address and such emails would be re-sent to the receiver. This
type of unreachable error email is called \double-bounce email"54) and they are
usually disposed of by the email server on the receiver's side. This mechanism of
generating double-bounce emails to collect malicious spam emails automatically
is utilized.
3.2.3 Autonomous Labeling System
To use double-bounce emails as training data under the supervised learning, the
class label of the data are needed. Needless to say, spammers try to conceal their
malicious intention; therefore, it is not easy to determine the maliciousness from
the collected double-bounce emails. The only way to identify the maliciousness
is by clicking the URLs. Evidently, this is very dangerous for general users;
therefore, a crawling-type web maliciousness analyzer called SPIKE is used, which
was developed by NICT in Japan.
Figure 3.2 illustrates how the maliciousness of URLs in a spam email is analyzed
in SPIKE60). The URL links in the email are ¯rst extracted from a double-
bounce email and SPIKE downloads the html ¯le and attached materials (e.g.,
java scripts, pdf, doc ¯les) in the entrance page. It then continues to ¯nd other
URLs in the downloaded pages again. This process is conducted recursively
by crawling the linked websites, and all the downloaded materials are analyzed.
Emails that are only link to a normal webpage with non-malicious contents are
considered as non-malicious spam emails (i.e., all contents of Webpage 1-6 in Fig.
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Figure 3.2 Example of web crawler and content analysis using SPIKE.
3.2 are normal), whereas the emails with at least one suspicious content (i.e., one
of Webpage 1-6 in Fig. 3.2 is malicious) are identi¯ed as malicious spam emails.
3.2.4 Text Processing and Feature Transformation
In order for the classi¯er to carry out the classi¯cation task e®ectively, the
classi¯er requires instances as the input instead of the raw spam emails for the
learning purpose. The instances consist of informative features with a ¯xed-
length which are extracted from the emails. Thus, appropriate pre-processing
steps are required so that the arbitrary data of text messages are transformed into
features with numerical features. Figure 3.1(b) demonstrates the pre-processing
module of the spam email detection system. Feature extraction of spam emails
involves tokenizing and lemmatizing the documents into bag-of-words (BoW).
Tokenization breaks the sentences in the emails into pieces of words and removes
frequent words called stop words such as `the', `which', `are', etc. Besides ¯ltering
out stop words, lemmatization also reduces the number of words in BoW by
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transforming redundant words that end with `ing', `ed' and `s' into their root
word (e.g., `learned' to `learn').
The BoW features usually consist thousands or millions of feature vectors. In
general, only some features are informative and are able to di®erentiate di®erent
classes. Therefore, feature selection is carried out to select the most informative
features in order to reduce the number of dimensions and avoid the computa-
tional complexity. Firstly, the initial training data are transformed into feature
vectors with term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) feature repre-
sentation. Next, linear `1-Support Vector Machines (`1-SVM) is used as a feature
selection strategy that requires two steps; training using linear SVM61) and elim-
inating features with low weights62). SVM is able to ¯nd a decision boundary by
optimizing the following objective function:
min
w;b
1
2
k w k2 +C
mX
i=1
»i
s.t. yi(w
TÁ(xi) + b) · 1¡ »i; (3.1)
»i · 0; i = 1; : : : ;m
which maximizes the margin k w k2 of hyperplane wTÁ(xi) + b between two
classes yi 2 §1 and contains only a minimum training error »i (i.e., training data
located above the support vectors which belong to the class of the training data).
The parameter C controls the trade o® between margin maximization and errors
of the SVM on training data, where a larger C corresponds to a higher penalty
to errors. The weights w obtained is used to select Nf number of features by
choosing the highest Nf -rank weights.
To represent the selected features of initial training data and the remaining
training data, the normalized TF-IDF63) is used to measure the importance of a
word to a document (i.e., document refers to the spam email) in the collection of
documents given by the following equation:
TF -IDF (t; d;D) =
fd(t)P
t fd(t)
¢ log
µ jDj
1 + jfd 2 D : t 2 dgj
¶
(3.2)
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where fd(t),
P
t fd(t), jDj and jfd 2 D : t 2 dgj are the frequency of term t in a
document d, the total frequencies of all terms in document d, the total number
of document in corpus and number of documents which have term t, respectively.
The normalized term frequency (TF) is used to provide a balanced value to all
documents that have a di®erent number of words. If term t appears frequently in
a document di and seldom occurs in other documents in D, the value of TF-IDF
would be high where both TF and inverse document frequency (IDF) obtain high
values. This indicates that term t is important to document di. Otherwise, if
either the occurrence of term t is low in document di or term t is always appears
in other documents in D, this would indicate that term t is not important to
document di where the value of TF-IDF is low or `0'.
Figure 3.3 (a) and (b) demonstrates an example of normal email and spam
email, respectively. Both email are attached with one or more URL links. As
mentioned before, some of the URL links in the spam email will direct the user
to harmful websites, thus, this type of spam email is categorized as malicious
spam email. Table 3.1 shows the overall pre-processing steps which consist of
tokenizing, lemmatizing, selecting important features and data representation.
After going through the entire procedure above, these data are used as the input
to the classi¯er model, where the example of RAN-LSH classi¯er calculation is
shown in Table 2.2.
3.2.5 Outlier Detection
Although SPIKE can judge the maliciousness of spam emails, the analysis
takes time, from a few minutes to even longer than ten minutes. Therefore, it is
di±cult to check all the collected double-bounce emails by SPIKE in real time.
The outlier detection mechanism is introduced into RAN-LSH in order to reduce
the number of spam emails to be checked by SPIKE. That is, only a new type
of unknown spam emails (i.e., outlier) should be selected and sent to SPIKE for
labeling. For this purpose, malicious spam email detection system is proposed by
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(a) Normal Email
(b) Spam Email
Figure 3.3 Example of normal and spam email.
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Table 3.1 Example of pre-processing for double-bounce email.
Example from Fig. 3.3(a): \Dear Ms./Mr. ALI, Thank you very much for your submission to
Memoirs. I would like to inform you that your paper has been published on the following website
(early publication) prior to the o±cial publication of Memoirs which is planned in March. \Dis-
tributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Backscatter Detection System Using Resource Allocating
Network with Data Selection" http://www.terrapub.co.jp/e-library/kobe-u memoirs en/ MA-
SUDA Sumio, Chair, Editorial Committee of Memoirs of the Graduate Schools of Engineering
and System Informatics, Kobe University".
Tokenize:
(i) Break
the sen-
tences
into single
word.
(ii) Re-
move stop
words.
\dear", \ms", \mr", \ali", \thank", \very", \much", \submission", \memoirs",
\like", \inform", \paper", \published", \following", \website", \early", \publi-
cation", \prior", \o±cial", \publication", \memoirs", \planned", \march", \dis-
tributed", \dnial", \service", \ddos", \backscatter", \detection", \system", \re-
source", \allocating", \network", \data", \selection", \http", \www", \terrapub",
\co", \jp", \e", \library", \kobe", \u", \memoirs", \en", \masuda", \sumio",
\chair", \editorial", \committee", \of", \memoirs", \of", \the", \graduate",
\schools", \of", \engineering", \and", \system", \informatics", \kobe", \university".
Removed stop words \you", \for", \your", \to", \i", \would", \that", \has", \been",
\on", \the", \of", \which", \is", \in", \using", \with"
Lemmatize:
Transform
the words
into root
word.
\submission" to \submit", \published" to \publish", \following" to \follow",
\planned" to \plan", \distributed" to \distribute", \denial", to \deny", \detection"
to \detect", \allocating" to \allocate", \editorial" to \editor", \schools" to \school",
\engineering" to \engineer".
Feature
selection
using
linear
`1-SVM
Let say terms \submit", \website", \publish", \www", \screenshot", \link",
\visit" and \see" are selected which produce the following matrix fd;t ="
1 1 3 1 0 0 0 0
2 0 4 0 2 5 1 1
#
.
Feature
represen-
tation:
TF-IDF
(i) IDF: IDF (submit) = log
 
2
1+2

= ¡0:1761, IDF (website) = log   2
1+1

=
0. IDF for term \submit" is equal to \publish", whereas IDF for the re-
maining terms is equal to IDF for term \website". Thus, the idf is given by
fd;t =
h
¡0:1761 0 ¡0:1761 0 0 0 0 0
i
. (ii) TF-IDF: TF-IDF(d; t) =
"
1
6
1
6
3
6
1
6
0 0 0 0
2
15
0 4
15
0 2
15
5
15
1
15
1
15
#
£
2666666666664
¡0:1761 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ¡0:1761 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777777775
=
"
¡0:0294 0 ¡0:0881 0 0 0 0 0
¡0:0235 0 ¡0:0470 0 0 0 0 0
#
.
(iii) Input vector (training data): Let say from SPIKE, doc1 is label as
non-malicious and doc2 as malicious. Training data x
0
1 = (x;d) =
([¡0:0294 0 ¡ 0:0881 0 0 0 0 0]; [0 1]) and x02 = (x;d) = ([¡0:0235 0 ¡
0:0470 0 0 0 0 0]; [1 0]). This system dataset would be X 0 = (x;class label) ="
¡0:0294 0 ¡0:0881 0 0 0 0 0 0
¡0:0235 0 ¡0:0470 0 0 0 0 0 1
#
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combining RAN-LSH classi¯er57) and SPIKE, so that the learning time is ac-
celerated compared to when using SPIKE alone. In this study, an outlier is
detected based on the output margin µm, outlier threshold µo and the occurrence
frequency threshold µN . The data with low output margins are considered as un-
known emails for the current classi¯er and thus should be categorized as outlier.
In addition, the number of similar data in each entry Ne is also important to
decide whether the data is outlier or not. It is assumed that the data that do not
frequently occurred (i.e., data allocated to an entry with small Ne) can also be
categorized as outlier although the output margins are slightly higher than µm.
The outlier °ag FOe is calculated as follows (see Algorithm 9 Line 12):
FOe =
8>>><>>>:
0 (FMe = 0)
0 (µm · ¢z(¹xe) < µo & Ne < µN):
1 (otherwise)
(3.3)
where ¹x0e and ~xi are the previous prototype which is registered in the entry e
and training data that belong to sth subset of unique hash values ~xi 2 ~Xs,
respectively. Meanwhile, Ne is the previous occurrence frequency of the entry e
and n is the number of training data that has a similar hash value. Whenever a
new training data is assigned to an entry, the occurrence frequency is increased
by one. ¹xe is regarded as the representative point of the subregion.
The algorithm of the outlier detection is summarized in Algorithm 9.
3.2.6 RAN-LSH Classi¯er
In this subsection, a brief explanation of the RAN-LSH classi¯er57) that illus-
trated in Fig. 3.1(c) is given. RAN-LSH is the extended model of the RAN12),
where LSH is adopted to select essential training data and RBF bases for fast
learning. There are three main components in RAN-LSH: hash table, data selec-
tion and classi¯er.
Algorithm 2 shows the overall learning procedures of RAN-LSH. During the
initial learning phase (Lines 1-2), initial training data are used to obtain the most
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suitable values of the following two important parameters: RBF width ¾ and the
number of partitions P . In addition, initial data are also used to obtain an initial
hash table and initial structure of the classi¯er. After that, the incremental
learning is carried out whenever training data are given to learn (Lines 3-10). In
LSH, similar data are allocated in the same hash entry with a high probability.
Therefore, the number of hash entries determines the granularity of input space
representation, and too large number of hash entries would result in both high
computational and memory costs in the data selection. Therefore, it is important
to design the hash functions such that a suitable number of hash entries are
created.
In RAN-LSH, PCA is adopted to generate a proper number of hash functions
by controlling the threshold of the accumulation ratio µa. Accumulation ratio
A(U l) is the ratio of input components in the approximated subspace over those
in the whole input space47). Giving a proper value of µa based on a tolerant ap-
proximation error, a proper number of hash functions is automatically determined
by selecting the number of partitions P via the cross-validation.
Let l be the subspace dimensions obtained by PCA. Then, the linear trans-
formation is considered to de¯ne hash values in LSH shown by Eq. (2.1). Each
projection vectors vi(i = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; l) is then divided into P partitions with equal
size. µa controls the number of eigenvectors U l. To obtain a hash code, data is
¯rst projected on all the eigenvectors ui and the hash code is obtained by com-
bining the encoded values for the projections. When a large µa is adopted, the
number of eigenvectors tends to become large and this would cause elongation of
the length of a hash code.
As shown in Algorithm 2 (see Lines 3-10), the incremental learning of RAN-
LSH is carried out not only for RAN-LSH classi¯er but also for the hash table.
Algorithm 4 illustrates the steps to create and update the hash table which is
used in RAN-LSH learning algorithm (Lines 1 (during Initialization), 5 and 9 in
Algorithm 2). Each subregion is allocated to an entry in a hash table, where each
64
entry is composed of ¯ve items: hash value h(¹xe), prototype ¹xe, margin °ag F
M
e ,
outlier °ag FOe and the occurrence frequency Ne (Fig. 3.1 : top right). The index
or a hash value is used as a key to ¯nd a matched entry e of a similar item which
has been registered previously in hash table (see the ¯rst condition in Algorithm
4 Line 6). Hash values h(x) = fH(v1); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; H(vl)g are a set of hash functions
H(vi), which are given by Eq. (2.2).
The next item is prototype ¹xe. A prototype is the mean vector of all data
allocated to each entry (see Algorithm 4 Lines 7 and 11) which is calculated as
follows:
¹xe =
(¹x0e ¤Ne) +
nX
i=1
³
~xi
´
Ne + n
: (3.4)
The third item is the margin °ag FMe and it is calculated by Eq. (2.5) (see
Algorithm 4 Line 12). The fourth item is the outlier °ag FOe which has been
discussed in subsection 3.2.5. The last item is the occurrence frequency Ne of
similar data in an entry. Whenever a new training data is assigned to an entry,
the occurrence frequency is increased by one.
When a large number of data are given simultaneously under an incremental
learning environment, it is important to learn only essential data in a classi¯er
model. Obviously, this is because the learning must be completed as quickly as
possible; otherwise, the next data may be given before the learning is completed.
In RAN-LSH, the data selection is conducted by using LSH. First, all Nd train-
ing data in a given training set are projected to l eigenvectors. Then, for each
training data, the projection value is encoded into a hash code whose granularity
is determined by the number of partitions P , and the obtained hash codes are
transformed into a hash value.
If a matched entry with the same hash value is found and the margin °ag FMe
is `1', it means the classi¯er is well trained (Line 6 in Algorithm 4). Then, the
mean vector is calculated and the occurrence frequency Ne is incremented by
n. Otherwise (Line 10 in Algorithm 4), the output margin ¢z in Eq. (1.5) is
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calculated and the margin °ag FMe and outlier °ag F
O
e are updated by Eqs. (2.5)
and (3.3), respectively. Note that the training data associated with the margin
°ag FMe = 1 are eliminated from the training set (see Algorithm 5 Lines 3-5). On
the contrary, if the margin °ag FMe is `0', it means a given data should be trained.
After the learning phase, the margin °ag FMe would be updated. Nevertheless,
updating the margin °ag of every prototype in the hash table would increase
the learning time. As mentioned before, the prototype with FMe = 1 means the
classi¯er is \well-trained" around the prototype. Thus, this prototype does not
need to be updated. Meanwhile, prototype with FMe = 0 should be updated
because there would probably be regions that have become \well-trained" after
the learning phase (Line 9 in Algorithm 2 and Lines 10-16 in Algorithm 4).
LSH is also used to ¯nd RBF bases near to the training data (Lines 3-6 in
Algorithm 6). In RAN-LSH, only the connection weights connected to the selected
RBF bases are updated in the following procedures. Firstly, the hash values of
RBF bases h(cj) are retrieved from a hash table. Next, the LSH distance dj for
each jth RBFs is calculated by Eq. (2.6).
Then, only RBF bases whose LSH distance is less than a threshold µp are
selected for a learning purpose. This is because it is considered that if the LSH
distance is large, the RBF output would become very small and the weight update
could be negligible. Finally, the selected RBF bases are used to solve the linear
equation in Eq. (1.3)11).
3.3 Performance Evaluation
3.3.1 Experimental Setup
The detection performance is evaluated under incremental learning settings to
study the following e®ects: (1) the e®ect of threshold parameters and (2) the
e®ectiveness of daily updates.
In the former experiment, the e®ects of the following three threshold parameters
to the performance is investigated: threshold of accumulation ratio µa, that of
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Figure 3.4 Comparison of learning scheme between batch learning and incremen-
tal learning.
output margin µm, and that of tolerant distance µp. In the latter experiment,
the e®ect of incremental learning is studied through comparison with the batch
learning scheme. Figure 3.4 illustrates how labeled spam emails are trained in (a)
batch learning scheme and (b) incremental learning scheme. In the batch learning
scheme, the conventional RBF network (RBFN) is adopted (i.e., RBFN usually
used as batch learning15)) as a classi¯er and a sliding window is introduced to
de¯ne a data set to be trained every day. In this experiment, the time-window
size is preliminarily determined as 12 days via the cross-validation using the spam
emails collected during a di®erent period. Therefore, as seen in Fig. 3.4(a),
the ¯rst learning stage is carried out on Day 12 using a set of spam emails
collected from Day 1 to Day 12, and the data set from Day 13 is used to test
the performance. Then, the time-window is shifted by one day at the second
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learning stage; that is, a set of spam emails collected from Day 2 to Day 13 is
used for training, and the data set from Day 14 is used to test. Note that RBFN
is retrained with a set of 12-day spam emails at every learning stage in a batch
mode. On the other hand, in the incremental learning scheme, batch learning is
¯rst applied to an initial data set, which is composed of spam emails collected in
the ¯rst 12 days. After that, this initial detection model is updated daily using
one day training data and the system is tested using the next day data. A set of
spam emails collected is forwarded to SPIKE to get the labels on maliciousness,
and the pairs of a spam email and its class label are used as a training set on
the next day. The number of collected spam emails is di®erent every day. Their
maximum, minimum, and average numbers are 756, 26, and 207, respectively.
In this detection system, three parameters are determined empirically. The
parameters are accumulation ratio µa, output margin µm and tolerant distance
µp. In the following experiment, the parameters are set to: µa = 0:9, µm = 0:2, and
µp = 2. Meanwhile, the error threshold " is set to 0.5. The other parameters, RBF
width ¾, the number of partitions P , errors penalty of SVM C, outlier threshold
µo, occurrence frequency threshold µN and time-window size are determined in
the initial learning phase through the cross-validation. There are 20,448 double-
bounce emails with 8,334 malicious spam emails and 12,114 non-malicious spam
emails used in this study that were collected from 1st March 2013 to 10th May
2013.
It is important for the proposed system to correctly classify not only positive
examples (malicious spam emails) but also negative ones (non-malicious spam
emails). Therefore, in this study, three evaluations are used which are: recall
rate, precision rate and F1 measure rate. The actual class labels are the class
labels given by SPIKE, whilst the prediction labels are obtained by the detection
system. The recall rate and the precision rate measure the ability of the detection
system to classify the malicious spam emails (positive samples) correctly which
takes into account di®erent types of error. On the other hand, the F1 measure
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is the harmonic mean of recall and precision rate. The recall rate considers type
II error (i.e., a malicious spam email is wrongly classi¯ed as non-malicious spam
email), whereas the precision rate considers type I error (i.e., a non-malicious
spam email is wrongly classi¯ed as malicious spam email). If the malicious spam
email detection system obtained a low recall rate, the users are exposed to the
danger of malware infection because some users may click an URL that leads to
malicious websites. Such a misclassi¯cation must be avoided in any cases. In the
second situation, there is low risk of the malware attack. The system only gives
strict conditions where most of the non-malicious spam emails are categorized
as malicious spam emails. Therefore, to design a good malicious spam email
detection system, it is crucial to have at least high percentage of recall rate to
reduce the risk of malware attack. However, if the malicious spam email detection
system is able to obtain high rate of both recall and precision, it can be concluded
that the developed system is nearly a perfect detection system.
3.3.2 E®ects of Threshold Parameters
First, let us examine the threshold parameters and their e®ect to the detection
system. Here, the in°uences of µa, µm and µp are studied so that the parame-
ters are optimized to ensure fast learning property of the detection system while
having low misclassi¯cation rate. The ¯rst parameter is the threshold of accumu-
lation ratio µa. If µa is set to a large value, an eigenspace to de¯ne hash functions
has high-dimensions. Thus, the length of a hash code becomes long, resulting in
the enlargement of a hash table. Therefore the searching of similar data would
require a longer time since there are many hash values registered in hash table.
The next parameter is the output margin threshold µm. This parameter controls
the amount of selected data to be learned by RAN-LSH. As the value of µm is
set to a higher value, the representation of the \not well-learned" region would
become wider and the number of selected data is increased in the incremental
learning phase, resulting in slower learning. The third important parameter is
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the tolerant distance µp which determines the distance of near RBF bases. By up-
dating the weights of only near RBF bases (i.e., using small value of µp), the time
needed to solve the linear equation using Singular Value Decomposition (SVD)
is shorten, thus the learning time would be accelerated.
To determine an appropriate value of each parameter, the cross-validation is
performed for the initial training set, and the obtained parameter values are ¯xed
over the incremental phase. Table 3.2 (a) and (b) show the F1 measure and the
learning time, respectively, using several combination values of the accumulation
ratio µa and output margin µm. As seen in Table 3.2(a), the highest F1 measure
is obtained when µa = 0:9 and µm = 0:2. For output margin µm · 0:2, F1
measure does not di®er much from the F1 measure with output margin µm = 0:2.
This result is not surprising because high value of output margins represents that
the data are \well-learned" or correctly classi¯ed. By adding these data, it is
expected that the classi¯cation rate would not improve although the number of
selected data and RBF bases created are increased. As a result for learning using
more training data shown by a higher µm, the learning time would also increase.
It is assumed that the data which are located on the border of di®erent classes
should have network outputs in the range of `0.4' to `0.6'. Therefore, the output
margins µm can be estimated to be between `0' to `0.2' where the data with output
margins in these range are important to be learned to reduce the misclassi¯cation
rate.
On the other hand, Table 3.3 demonstrates the suitable value of the tolerant
distance µp using appropriate value of µa and µm obtained previously which are
`0.9' and `0.2', respectively. Tolerant distance µp also give in°uence to the clas-
si¯cation rate and the speed of the detection system by controlling the distance
which de¯nes the area of near RBF bases. As we can see, the suitable value for
the tolerant distance is 2. It means that only the RBF centers that di®er from the
given training data at two projection vector vi are used to update the weight. If
the µp is too small, it indicates that the area of selected RBF bases is not enough
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Table 3.2 The evaluation using several values of accumulation ratio µa and output
margin threshold µm for the spam email detection system. The performance
measures are: (a) the F1 measure, and (b) initial learning time.
(a) F1 measure [%]
µm
µa
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.5 82.8 87.0 88.4 88.2 88.1
0.7 86.6 87.3 90.5 87.8 88.2
0.9 87.0 87.7 90.8 88.0 87.9
(b) Initial learning time [sec.]
µm
µa
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.5 126.5 128.6 130.1 130.3 131.2
0.7 128.0 129.7 130.3 130.9 132.6
0.9 128.6 129.8 132.1 132.7 139.8
Table 3.3 The performance using di®erent values of tolerant distance µp.
µp
Evaluation
0 1 2 5
F1 measure [%] 88.5 88.8 89.3 89.3
Initial learning time [sec.] 138.2 139.1 140.1 144.9
to approximate the weights correctly. Whereas for µp that is too large, it would
be similar to the approach of updating weights using all RBF bases. Thus, the
size of RBF outputs © in Eq. (1.3) would be bigger and therefore, the decom-
position steps using SVD would require a longer time. Even though the results
show the evaluation performance during initial learning, it is expected a similar
result from the incremental learning phase. It is because parameter µa, µm and µp
are also required during the incremental learning phase. For the next experiment,
the values of µa, µm and µp are set to be '0.2', `0.9' and `2', respectively.
3.3.3 E®ectiveness of Incremental Learning
All learning parts in the detection system including pre-processing and classi-
¯er module are very crucial which give e®ect to the performance result. In this
experiment, the performance of the proposed online detection system is compared
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Figure 3.5 Transitions of recall rates in the malicious spam email detection system
with three learning schemes.
Figure 3.6 Transitions of precision in the malicious spam email detection system
with three learning schemes.
with di®erent learning scheme and classi¯er model to see the competency of the
proposed method. Figure 3.5 and Fig. 3.6 show the recall rate and precision
rate for the detection system with the following three combinations of classi¯ers
and learning schemes: RBFN (batch learning), RAN (incremental learning), and
RAN-LSH (incremental learning) (see Fig. 3.4). The batch learning is carried
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Table 3.4 Overall performance of malicious spam email detection system.
Performance RBFN RAN RAN-LSH
evaluation batch incremental incremental
Recall Rate [%] 94.6 89.4 90.7
Precision Rate [%] 90.7 90.8 87.2
F1 Measure [%] 92.2 89.3 87.7
Learning Time [sec.] 4532.7 432.0 9.4
out using 12-days of training data and it is retrained incrementally. While for
the incremental learning, the classi¯er is updated incrementally using 1-day of
training data. As seen in Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6, the proposed one-pass learning of
the detection system is capable to learn and carry out the classi¯cation task e®ec-
tively since the proposed system obtained almost the same classi¯cation rate as
the memory-based learning approach (i.e., batch learning). In fact, the proposed
method does not need large memory size to store the training data compared
to the memory-based learning. In this study, 12-days length of window size is
used for the batch learning to learn incrementally, whereas for incremental learn-
ing, only 1-day data set is used as training data. Besides that, the performance
of conventional classi¯er RAN is compared using the same incremental learning
scheme. My previous study in57) shows that RAN-LSH can learn fast. As seen in
Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6, the detection system obtains a comparable result against
the conventional classi¯er model.
3.3.4 Overall Performance of Malicious Spam Email Detection Sys-
tem
The overall performance is evaluated by averaging over the whole incremental
learning phase. The recall rate, precision rate and F1-measure for the three
learning models are summarized in Table 3.4. From Table 3.4, it can be seen that
the proposed detection system can learn 482 times faster than the conventional
RBFN model, and can learn 46 times faster than RAN. This is because the
detection system can ¯nd a set of similar data in a given training set very quickly
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using LSH; thus, only a data set falling in an untrained region are selected to
learn and the others are discarded. In addition, only near RBF centers are used
to update the connection weights. The recall rate and F1 measure of RBFN are
higher than those of the other incremental models because this model keeps a
large number of data for training; where this requires high computational costs
and large memory. Since the classi¯cation rate of recall rate, precision rate and
F1 measure do not di®er much from the other model, it can be concluded that
the proposed system is able to update e±ciently and able to give class label of
the incoming emails within a short time.
3.4 Conclusions
A malicious spam email detection system using BoW features is proposed,
where the classi¯er adopts LSH to select essential data and near RBF bases. Two
types of essential data are used: (1) the data located close to a class boundary, and
(2) the data located outside of the learned region (i.e., outlier). The proposed
scheme provides desirable learning characteristics as an autonomous malicious
spam email detection system and able to adapt to new trends of malicious emails
quickly. In addition, the detection system is quite fast compared with SPIKE
which often needs a long time to complete the maliciousness analysis. By using
the proposed system, it is possible to give proper alerts to users quickly based
on up to date information. Since the learning is quite fast and the detection
performance is comparable to the conventional models, it can be concluded that
the proposed system is suitable to be implemented in an email client software on
the user side.
Currently, the proposed detection system has no pruning function for RBF
bases. Therefore, as the learning is continued for a long time, the number of
RBF could be increased excessively, and this causes longer learning time. Then,
in the worst scenario, the learning may not converge before new training data
are given. To avoid such a disastrous situation, a proper number of RBF bases
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should always be maintained by introducing an online pruning mechanism into
RAN-LSH. Besides that, the detection system uses selected features from initial
learning training data. As future work, an adaptive hash table is inteded to
be constructed to adapt to the changes of feature vectors from the recent BoW
without forgetting the previous knowledge. It is expected that the detection
system would be more stable and robust to the new malicious spam email attacks.
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Chapter 4
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
Backscatter Detection System Using Resource
Allocating Network with Data Selection
4.1 Introduction
As many people greatly rely on the Internet these days, potential threats to have
cyber attacks are increasing. One of these serious threats is DDoS attack. DDoS
attack has been used by cyber criminals to cause damage virtually to the targeted
organization especially organizations which rely on Internet such as news sites,
political parties, ¯nancial institutions, gaming cites and online businesses. DDoS
attack can cause material losses (i.e., ¯nance and resources bandwidth), ruin the
reputation of the targeted company or organization and decreased the consumers
con¯dence. By saturating the targeted bandwidth with fake requests, this attack
can cause the legitimate users to experience a slowed down internet services when
requesting connection to targeted websites, or even in worst cases, the targeted
websites would su®er a total blockage for a minutes, several hours or even a week.
Recently, the worst attack in history was recorded on 20th November 2014, when
500 gigabits per second of junk tra±c were pounded at Apple Daily and Pop Vote
which are two independent news site at Hong Kong64). In the previous year, 300
gigabits per seconds of DDoS attack had been recorded attacking DNS system
operated by Spamhaus which caused a slowed down Internet around the world65).
Given the devastating e®ects of DDoS attack on our cyber infrastructure, it is very
important to detect the DDoS attack as quickly as possible before the Internet
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tra±c is totally down.
Backscatter is the after-e®ect of DDoS attack when the source Internet Protocol
(IP) addresses are spoofed by the attacker. Backscatter happens when the target
server sends unsolicited response packets to the spoofed IP addresses. Some
of these random IP addresses are directed to the darknet (i.e., a set of unused
IPs). By spoo¯ng the source IP addresses, the attackers not only can amplify the
DDoS attack, but also are able to conceal their identity. According to the reports
on the Cloud°are website66), 92% of DoS attacks using Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) at Cloud°are are through Port 80 (Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP)), and 97% of the Denial of Services (DoS) attacks using User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) are through Port 53 (Domain Name System (DNS)). Basically,
it is expected that the companies and organizations with service-based websites
would have a trend of attack similar to Cloud°are. It is because web servers often
use TCP Port 80 (80/TCP), whereas DNS servers usually use Port 53 (53/UDP).
The most common DDoS attack is using \°ood" attack in which a large number
of packets containing useless information are sent by this °ood through various
internet protocols such as TCP and UDP67). The main purpose of the °ood attack
is to occupy the server resources so that the server is unavailable to the legitimate
user. To send DDoS attack through 80/TCP, ¯rstly, the attacker would request
a connection by sending packets with SYN °ag set to `1' to the World Wide
Web (www) of the targeted server using a spoofed source IP address. Then, the
targeted server would send a response packet with SYN-ACK °ags to the source
IP addresses. The targeted server is under the DDoS attack when the attacker
sends a SYN °ood to the targeted server using botnet and consumes the available
resources by refusing to respond the SYN-ACK °ags. Since the available resources
are consumed by these overwhelming connection requests and waiting period
for reply packets with ACK °ag, the targeted server would denies any request
from the legitimate users. Another frequent attack is using 53/UDP in which
the attacker manipulates the operation of the DNS server to amplify the DDoS
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attack. DNS server is used to search the corresponding IP address of the requested
internet domain name. Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) \Destination
Unreachable" message would be generated the moment after the system had
noticed inactive ports. Thus, the additional packets containing these messages
would cause tra±c congestion at the targeted server when a large number of UDP
packets are sent to these inactive ports.
Both attacks from labeled packets (80/TCP and 53/UDP) are easy to be de-
tected based on the °ags in these packets. However, for other protocols with
di®erent port numbers, usually an expert is hired to analyze the characteristics
of packet tra±c manually. This method is time consuming and is costly because
a professional needs to be hired. Therefore, an autonomous DDoS backscatter
detection for all protocols and port numbers is proposed using RAN-LSH classi-
¯er. The RAN classi¯er is embedded with the well-known LSH technique which
is used to select essential data. The LSH method indeed has proven to be able
to quickly ¯nd similar objects in a large database4, 5, 6, 7, 8).
Although extensive research has been carried out on DDoS attack detection
using machine learning model68, 69, 70, 71), to my knowledge, no attempt was done
to explore the potential of data selection to speed up the learning time of the
DDoS attack detection system. To address this gap, RAN-LSH classi¯er is used
which embedded with data selection to learn only essential data. Learning irrel-
evant data would not only lead to a slow learning time58) but also can cause the
deterioration in detection performance of a classi¯er. Oyang et. al.59) suggest
that the training samples that are located near to the boundaries between di®er-
ent classes would carry more crucial information. By calculating the di®erence
between the highest network output and the second highest network output, the
training data is judged whether are located near the class boundaries or not. With
the expectation that if the di®erence between them is large, it means that the
given data is \well-learned", whereas the small di®erence indicates that the data
is \not well-learned". It is assumed that the \not well-learned" data is located
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at the class boundaries and is essential to be learned. In this study, an output
margin is de¯ned by the di®erence between the two highest network outputs. By
combining the margin-based data selection with LSH technique, the learning time
is expected to be accelerated.
To evaluate this detection system, darknet packets collected by NICT are used
in this study. Darknet is a group of IP addresses which is not connected to any
active services such as computer, printer or router. Thus, it is unusual for darknet
to receive any packets since darknet is not capable to start any communication
with other server. Based on this fact, darknet is an e®ective medium for collecting
data set of DDoS attack because a large number of true positive data (i.e., DDoS
backscatter packets) can be collected with only small number of false positive
data (i.e., DDoS non-backscatter packets). There are at least two possibilities
of false positive data, which are from miscon¯gurated IP setting and the scan
activity by botnet to ¯nd available IP addresses to be spoofed. Since NICT has
the largest network monitoring system in Japan that assembled 140 thousands
unused Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4)72), a good data set is expected to be
collected using this resources.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the overall
architecture of the proposed DDoS detection system. Section 4.3 validates the
e®ectiveness of the detection system to detect the DDoS attack from di®erent
protocols and port numbers, other than labeled packets. Finally, conclusions and
future work are discussed in Section 4.4.
4.2 The Proposed DDoS Backscatter Detection System
4.2.1 System Architecture
Figure 4.1 shows the overall architecture of DDoS backscatter detection system.
IP addresses can be divided into the following two categories: livenet and darknet.
Livenet consists of a group of IP addresses that are connected to actual hosts and
devices (i.e., desktop, laptop and printer). While the remaining IP addresses
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Figure 4.1 The architecture of DDoS backscatter detection system.
other than livenet are included in darknet category. In general, there should
not be any legitimate packets sent to a darknet. However, there is a possibility
of con¯guration errors during data transmission, which mistakenly end up to
reach darknet. Nevertheless, there are users who intentionally use darknet to
perform cyber criminal activities such as DDoS attack. In this study, darknet
packets collected by NICT is used as data set. There are two main modules of
the detection system, which are pre-processing and classi¯er. Firstly, the raw
darknet packets are passed to the pre-processing module where the packets are
transformed into feature vectors. Then, these feature vectors are given to the
classi¯er for learning and testing. Algorithm 10 shows the overall procedures of
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the detection system which consists of the following two learning phases: initial
learning (Lines 1-3) and incremental learning (Lines 4-9).
4.2.2 Pre-processing
To make sure that the classi¯er of the detection system can learn the decision
boundary of di®erent classes (i.e., DDoS backscatter or non-backscatter), only
important information are extracted from raw data packets. Algorithm 11 shows
the pre-processing procedures to create the data set of the DDoS backscatter.
First and foremost, the darknet packets are sorted according to the source IP
addresses (Line 2). Next, 17 features are extracted from the ¯rst one-minute
packets as one data (Line 5). Here, a new data is de¯ned as two sequential packets
which are separated by one hour of time interval between them (Lines 3-4). For
training data, the feature vectors consist of 17 features and the corresponding
class label (xi;di), whereas the test data do not contain the class label in the
feature vectors xi. The 17 features which are extracted from raw data packets
are as follow:
(1) Number of packets.
(2) Average for the di®erence of the time between packets.
(3) Variance for the di®erence of the time between packets.
(4) Number of Source Port.
(5) Average of the numbers of packets to each Source Port.
(6) Variance of the numbers of packets to each Source Port.
(7) Number of protocol.
(8) Number of destination IP addresses.
(9) Average of the numbers of packets to each Destination IP.
(10) Variance of the numbers of packets to each Destination IP.
(11) Average for the di®erence of Destination IP between packets.
(12) Variance for the di®erence of Destination IP between packets.
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(13) Number of Destination ports.
(14) Average of the numbers of packets to each Destination port.
(15) Variance of the numbers of packets to each Destination port.
(16) Average of payloads (the cargo of a data transmission).
(17) Variance of payloads.
Besides extracting features, the training data would also be given a class label
in the pre-processing module. Figure 4.2 illustrates an example of one DDoS
backscatter data and one non-backscatter data in which the darknet packets are
labeled based on the tra±c features. As we can see, the ¯gure has four di®erent
axes which are time and source port number at the ¯rst half in the left side,
whereas destination IP and destination port number at the second half in the
right side. The source is referred to target server, while destination is referred
to the darknet. The straight line from a point at target server side to a point
at darknet side corresponds to the duration time to sent the packet. Each lines
are colored with di®erent color to di®erentiate the internet protocol and TCP
control °ag which are used by each packets. Yellow, purple, green, red and black
represent SYN-ACK packet in TCP, RST packet in TCP, ACK packet in TCP,
UDP packet and ICMP packet, respectively. From this ¯gure, a notable rules to
di®erentiate backscatter with non-backscatter data, are obtained. For example,
from Fig. 4.2(a), it can be seen that a large amount of packets is sent in a short
time to a various destination IP address, which represent a typical behavior of
DDoS attack. On the other hand, Fig. 4.2(b) shows that there is no DDoS attack
because the time interval between two sequence packets is longer and involves only
a small number of packet, compared to Fig. 4.2(a).
The steps to assign a class label to the labeled packets are shown by Algorithm
12. If the source host sends more than 40 packets per minute and its response °ag
FR is equals to `1' (Line 11), then the feature vector for the one-minute darknet
tra±c is classi¯ed as DDoS backscatter. To set the response °ag as FR = 1, the
data from 80/TCP and 53/UDP (labeled packets) need to ful¯ll the conditions
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Figure 4.2 The example of darknet packets activity based on tra±c features for:
(a) DDoS backscatter and (b) DDoS non-backscatter.69)
in Line 3 and Line 7, respectively. The remaining data are labeled as non-DDoS
backscatter.
Table 4.1 shows the overall procedures of darknet packets' pre-processing using
example in Fig. 4.3. The pre-processing procedures consist of feature extraction
and labeling. The darknet packets data that have been converted to feature
vectors X = (x; class label), would be passed to RAN-LSH to be learned as
input. Firstly, the essential data are selected using LSH before passing to RAN
classi¯er in which the weights update is carried out using near RBF bases. Table
2.2 shows an example of learning data using RAN-LSH classi¯er.
4.2.3 RAN-LSH Classi¯er
RBFN73) has at least three desirable properties: (1) the architecture of the
model is simple and it can easily be modi¯ed from batch learning algorithm to
incremental learning algorithm74), (2) the ability to approximate any function if a
su±cient number of hidden units are given14), and (3) the capability of handling
the classi¯cation problem of more than two classes in a single run59). In this
study, the incremental model of RBFN so-called RAN12) is used.
Algorithm 2 shows the learning algorithm of RAN-LSH which has been pro-
posed in57). This model is the extended model of RAN which adopted the LSH-
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Figure 4.3 Example of darknet packet for pre-processing.
based data selection to accelerate the learning time. The RBF centers of RAN-
LSH are not trained but selected based on the error between the prediction class
label obtained by the classi¯er model using Eq. (1.2) and actual class label of
the training data d. Low error means that the existing RBF centers are \well-
learned". On the other hand, high error value indicates that the RBF centers are
\not well-learned" and thus, it is necessary to add the data as a new RBF center
in the hidden layer node (Algorithm 1 Lines 5 and 17). Besides the RBF centers
selection, another important element in RAN classi¯er is updating the connection
weights. To shorten the learning time, instead of using all RBF centers to update
the weights, only local RBF centers which are RBF centers that are located near
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to the training data are used (Algorithm 2 Line 10).
RAN-LSH model is base on the idea that the data which are located near to
each other would probably have almost similar value of RBF outputs and network
outputs. Therefore, data that located near to each other are grouped into a same
group which is called as region. LSH technique consists of two main steps: ¯rstly,
to group similar data into a same group, and secondly, to store them in a table
called hash table where hash values are used as the index of the hash table. With
the former step, the data are projected into several one-dimensional of projection
vectors and each of the projection vectors is divided into equal size of partition
or called as prtition. With the latter step, the hash values which correspond to
a buckets are comprise of a hash function for every projection vectors. When
two di®erent data are always assigned in the same partition while the directions
of the projected vectors are changing multiple numbers of times, it means that
the data are most probably located close to each other. Nevertheless, assigning
to many projection vectors would leads to the construction of a bigger size of
hash table that requires not only larger memory but also longer processing time.
Therefore, it is important to choose a proper number of hash functions. PCA can
generate a proper number of hash functions by controlling the threshold of the
accumulation ratio µa.
A sub-region is de¯ned by a series of assigned partition which are divided based
on the l projection values. Each sub-regions is stored as an entry in hash table.
A hash table is composed of the following three items: hash value he, prototype
¹xe and margin °ag F
M
e . The index or the hash values he are used as a key to
¯nd a matching entry e of a similar item which has been registered previously in
hash table (Figure 4.1: top right). Hash values h in Eq. (2.3) are a series of hash
function H(vi) given by Eq. (2.2).
The prototype ¹xe is the average value of data in each entry of the hash table.
If the hash values have not been registered in the hash table, the margin °ag is
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calculated as follow:
FMe =
8<: 1 (¢z(xe) > µm) & (zk0(xe) > µz)0 (otherwise) (4.1)
where the output margin ¢z is given by the di®erence between the highest net-
work output and second highest network output which is calculated using Eq.
(1.5). If the °ag of the matched prototype is `1', it means the classi¯er is \well-
trained" around the prototype; therefore, there is no need to train a given data.
On the contrary, if the °ag is `0', it means a given data should be trained. Af-
ter the learning phase, the margin °ag FM should be updated. Nevertheless,
updating the margin °ag of every prototype in the hash table would increase
the learning time. As mentioned before, the prototype with FM = 1 means the
classi¯er is well trained around the prototype. Thus, this prototype does not
need to be updated. Meanwhile, prototype with FM = 0 should be updated
because there would probably be regions that have become \well-trained" after
the learning phase.
The LSH is also used to ¯nd near RBF bases to the training data. These RBF
bases are used to update the connection weights. Firstly, the hash values of RBF
bases are retrieved from the constructed hash table. Next, the LSH distance d¤j
for each jth RBFs is calculated using Eq. (2.6). Then the RBF centers with
LSH distances that are less or equal to µp would be selected to solve the linear
equation in Eq. (1.3).
4.3 Performance Evaluation
4.3.1 Experimental Setup
To evaluate the performance of the detection system with data selection mech-
anism, the following two experiments on is carried out: (1) the in°uence of the
threshold parameters for output margin µm and network output µz and (2) the
e®ectiveness of incremental learning.
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The ¯rst experiment is carried out to see the e®ects of di®erent values µm
and µz using initial training data. In the second experiment, the performance of
the three classi¯er models are compared: RBFN, RAN and RAN-LSH. RBFN is
learned with data within a 90-day time window in a batch learning mode, and
the time window is shifted at every 1 day for an online learning purpose. For
instance, the ¯rst learning stage is carried out using data Day 277 until Day 366
as training data and data Day 367 as test data. During the next learning stage,
the time-window is shifted by one, as such for the second learning stage, Day
278 until Day 367 is used for training, whereas the performance are tested using
data Day 368. On the other hand, RAN and RAN-LSH are trained with data of
the ¯rst 90 days, and then they are trained incrementally with a chunk of data
given everyday. The ¯rst learning stage is similar to those in batch learning. The
di®erence is the model is updated only with the data given in a day (i.e., the past
data are not kept and used for a learning purpose). For example, in the second
learning stage, Day 367 and Day 368 are used as training data and test data,
respectively. The learning steps are continued using the next sequence of data
until all data have been learned by the model. Since the training data are given
based on window-size, the sizes of a data chunk are di®erent at every learning
stage. The number of data in a 90-day time window ranges from 8,513 to 13,558,
and 11,123 on average. Whereas, the minimum, maximum and average numbers
of data collected in a day are 0, 436 and 41, respectively.
In this detection system, four parameters are determined empirically which are
accumulation ratio µa, output margin µm, network output µz and tolerant distance
µp. In the ¯rst experiment, the e®ect of output margin µm and network output µz
is investigated regarding the detection rate and learning time, so that the data
selection mechanism is carried out e®ectively. In the following experiment, the
parameters are set to: µa = 0:9, µm = 0:01, µz = 0:6 and µp = 2. Meanwhile,
the error threshold " and ± are set to 0.5 and
p
2¾, respectively. The other
parameters, RBF width ¾ and the number of partitions P are determined in
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the initial learning phase through the cross-validation. There are 9,968 data of
labeled packets (9,404 backscatter and 564 non-backscatter) collected from 1st
January 2013 to 31st December 2013 (1 year). For the test purpose, 5,933 data
of unlabeled packets (2,464 backscatter and 3,469 non-backscatter) are collected
from 1st January 2014 to 20th January 2014 (20 days).
Besides measuring the learning time, the performance of the detection system
is also evaluated based on recall rate, precision rate and F1 measure. The recall
rate measures the ratio correctly classi¯ed as DDoS backscatter (True Positive)
out of expected DDoS backscatter determined by the classi¯er. Meanwhile, the
precision rate measures the True Positive sample out the total of data with DDoS
backscatter class label. The F1 measure is the harmonic mean of both recall and
precision rates. For this detection system, it is more crucial to have at least high
percentage of recall rate to reduce the risk of misclassifying DDoS attack, where a
low recall rate indicates that the detection system has mistakenly classi¯ed many
backscatter data as non-backscatter. Therefore, in this situation, a right action to
salvage a targeted host could be delayed, resulting in a signi¯cant loss. However,
having too low precision rate is also inappropriate because the detection system
tends to have classi¯ed most of the data as backscatter.
4.3.2 Parameter Tuning for Data Selection
For RAN-LSH classi¯er which uses LSH data selection, two important param-
eters have been identi¯ed to a®ect the detection rate and learning time, namely
the thresholds for output margin µm and network output µz. Table 4.2 shows
the result of parameter tuning for µm and µz using three months of training data
and 20-days of test data regarding three evaluation: (a) number of data selected,
(b) F1 measure, and (c) learning time. Equation (2.5) indicates that the higher
the threshold values of µm and µz are, the more stringent the requirements to
determine the data as \well-learned". Thus, if high values are used for both pa-
rameters, it is expected that only a few data would have margin °ag FM = 1.
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Table 4.2 Parameter tuning of data selection using three months training data
and 20 days test data. The performance are measured regarding the (a) total
number of selected data, (b) F1 measure [%] and (c) learning time [sec.]
(a) Total number of selected data
µz
µm
0.5 0.6 0.75
0.01 2704 3839 6690
0.05 3115 3839 6745
0.1 3319 3839 6891
0.2 3769 3844 6891
(b) F1 Measure [%]
µz
µm
0.5 0.6 0.75
0.01 89.4 91.2 93.1
0.05 89.5 91.3 93.1
0.1 90.1 91.3 93.1
0.2 91.1 91.3 93.1
(c) Learning time [sec.]
µz
µm
0.5 0.6 0.75
0.01 1122.5 5008.1 46071.2
0.05 1915.0 5021.5 46464.9
0.1 2510.4 5284.4 47926.5
0.2 4316.8 5528.8 48184.4
Consequently, the learning time is expected to be increased because many data
should be selected to learn the detection system (i.e., data with margin °ag
FM = 0). To accelerate the learning time, the number of selected data should be
small by tuning both µm and µz.
By depending on only the output margin µm alone to determine whether the
data are located in \well-learned" region or not, it is not enough to reduce the
number of selected data e®ectively. Table 4.2(a) shows that the number of selected
data is high even though a small value of µm is used (i.e., µm = 0:01) for di®erent
values of µz. Almost twice the number of selected data is able to be reduced if
another threshold is used namely µz. To ensure that the selected data provides a
high detection rate, the F1 measure of µz value should not di®er much compared
to the other value of µz. For RAN-LSH model with µz = 0:6 and µm = 0:01,
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Table 4.3 Comparison of three di®erent model: RBFN, RAN and RAN-LSH,
using di®erent learning scheme. RBFN uses batch learning, whereas RAN and
RAN-LSH use incremental learning setting. The performance are measured re-
garding (a) the recall rate [%], (b) precision rate [%], (c) F1 measure [%], and (d)
learning time [s].
RBFN RAN RAN-LSH RAN-LSH
Evaluation (batch- (incremental- (incremental- (incremental-
retrained) with update) without update) with update)
Recall rate [%] 98.4 98.1 98.1 97.8
Precision rate [%] 96.2 97.2 65.9 97.4
F1 measure [%] 97.3 97.6 77.8 97.5
Learning time [s] 58135.5 207.9 3.3 46.2
almost 10 times of learning time can be shortened and about 0.9% of di®erence
at F1 measure, compared to the model with µz = 0:75 and µm = 0:2. Taking
the tradeo® between short learning time and high detection rate into account
(see Table 4.2(b) and 4.2(c)), µz = 0:6 and µm = 0:01 are the most suitable for
reducing the learning time of the detection system.
4.3.3 Performance of DDoS Detection System
Table 4.3 shows the performance comparison between three di®erent classi¯ers:
RBFN, RAN and RAN-LSH regarding recall rate, precision rate, F1 measure
and learning time. RBFN uses batch learning, while RAN and RAN-LSH use
incremental learning, in which the learning modes are explained in Section 4.3.1.
The results obtained are expected and not surprising. The detection system using
RBFN classi¯er obtains the highest recall rate compared to other classi¯ers. This
is because the RBFN classi¯er learns using a large number of training data (data
collected during the 90-day window size). Since this classi¯er is retrained in
every learning stage, this classi¯er requires longer learning time than RAN and
RAN-LSH. By learning incrementally, RAN and RAN-LSH classi¯er updated
the weights of the classi¯er using only the recent training data. This can save
a lot of time. Moreover, using RAN classi¯er with LSH-based data selection
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(RAN-LSH), the detection system is capable to learn faster than RAN, because
only essential data from the training data are selected to be learned, instead
learning all given training data using RAN classi¯er. Based on the result shown
in Table 4.3, to give class labels to 5,581 test data, RBFN and RAN requires
approximately 10.4 (sec.) and 0.04 (sec.), respectively in average for each test
data. As for RAN-LSH, only 0.008 (sec.) is required which is 130 times faster
than RBFN classi¯er and ¯ve times faster than the RAN classi¯er. Since the
recall rate is not signi¯cantly di®erent, the detection system with RAN-LSH
classi¯er is expected to detect DDoS backscatter faster, and hence allowing the
moderator of the targeted server to take precautious action on the suspicious IP
addresses before the Internet tra±c of the targeted server is e®ected by the DDoS
attack. Besides that, the e®ectiveness of updating RAN-LSH classi¯er in every
learning stage is also examined. It is obvious that without updating the RAN-
LSH classi¯er using the recent training data, the overall performance is dropped
where we can see that the precision rate and the F1 measure decreased about
20%. Based on this result, it gives an evidence that the incremental learning of
the detection system is carried out e®ectively.
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, a fast DDoS backscatter detection system for unlabelled packets
is proposed using RAN-LSH classi¯er. It has been shown that the proposed
detection system is capable to perform well, comparable to the detection system
using conventional classi¯ers (RBFN and RAN). The current ¯ndings add to a
growing body of literature on LSH, in which LSH is used to ¯nd similar data.
However, in this study, LSH is used to select essential data to learn the detection
system. The proposed detection system provides a desirable characteristic as
a DDoS backscatter detection system. At every minute, darknet packets are
transformed into a feature vector and it is provided to the RAN-LSH classi¯er to
detect DDoS backscatter. The time to classify needs less than 0.01 (sec.).
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The proposed system has some limitations when deployed under a real envi-
ronment. First, the labelling of darknet packet features is not easy except for the
packets of 80/TCP and 53/UDP. Basically, the labelling must be carried out by
expert surveyors through visual observation. Therefore, only unreliable decision
by a classi¯er should be presented to a surveyor for a labelling purpose. However,
this function is not implemented in the proposed detection system at this preset.
Second, there are a few parameters that need to be tuned during initial learning
in order to achieve high detection rate. The parameters are RBF width ¾, the
number of partitions P , error threshold ", distance threshold ±, accumulation
ratio µa, tolerant distance µp, output margin µm and the highest network output
µz.
The above issues are left as the future work.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this dissertation, the study of large-scale stream data is chosen as the main
theme since this area are becoming compulsary for the researchers to be prepared
of °ood of stream data in near future. The large-scale stream data usually involves
most application including the cybersecurity. Moreover, this ¯eld needs a rapid
enhancement to support the rapid changes which made by the cybercriminals
when a new campaign is announced. As mentioned before, there are at least
three major issues to be solved in large-scale stream data which the system that
has been developed need to be able:
(1) to monitor the incoming data non-stop,
(2) to handle a growing number of data, and
(3) to learn fast.
To equipped a proposed system with those three criteria, a machine learning is
one of a good choice which is more e®ective compare to using human resources.
In general, learning all training data (i.e., batch learning) is not a good strategy
under online learning environments, especially when a large number of data are
given as a sequence. To enhance the adaptability to such dynamic environments,
the learning should be carried out with essential data that are selected in an
online fashion. There are two types of essential data for a learning purpose.
One is the data located close to a class boundary, while the other is the data
located in the outside of learned region (i.e., outlier). In order to ensure fast
and accurate learning, the data selection mechanism should be introduced into a
classi¯er model to ¯nd such essential data from a given chunk of data.
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The ¯rst type of essential data are selected using LSH4, 5, 6, 7, 8). In RAN-LSH,
whether a data exists in \well-trained region" or not is determined by calculating
a hash value. If the margin °ag in a matched entry is `1', it means a \well-
trained region", and `0' otherwise. On the other hand, the second type of essential
data are selected by the outlier detection, which relies on the output margin of
the RAN-LSH classi¯er. Thus, the objective of this dissertation is to develop
a model or system that can learned the stream data in high speed especially
for cybersecurity application, so that the after-e®ect of cybercriminals attacks
from both malicious spam email and DDoS attack can be avoided by discarding
harmful email or data packets from reaching the user-end.
Another major issue in cybersecurity is to obtain a large number of cybersecu-
rity dataset with a class label. It is usually di±cult to obtain such data, because
to collect these data from any organization or company, the researcher need to
follow a strict guideline to preserve the con¯dentiality and privacy of the data.
Besides that, it is also hard to assign a class label to each of the acquired data. To
solve the ¯rst issue, the dataset of malicious spam email and DDoS backscatter
attack in this study are collected from a server that gathered double-bounce email
and packets from darknet, respectively. Since the data could not be sent back to
the sender (i.e, the sender spoofed the email address or destination IP address),
these data are quite suspicious and have a higher possibility to hold a malicious
intention. Therefore, by using double bounce email and darknet packets, it is
expected that the proportion of positive examples would be higher compare to
conventional method. This give an advantage when the labeling process which is
carried out based on rule-based from the pool of positive examples. The labeling
for malicious spam email is carried out using SPIKE, whereas for darknet packets,
the data are assigned a class label from analysis of tra±c features.
95
5.1 Contributions of This Dissertation
In Chapter 2, a new incremental learning algorithm of RBFN is proposed called
RAN-LSH to speed-up the learning of large-scale data sequences. Since the time
to calculate the connection weight of RBFN is propotional to the number of
training data, a huge amount of time is required to complete the incremental
learning if many training data are used. Therefore, by removing similar training
data, the number of data to be trained can be reduced and contributes to fast
incremental learning. In order to search similar data, LSH partitioning is adopted
to group similar data in the same bucket and choose data with margin °ag equals
to \0". In addition, by reusing the hash table from LSH method to choose near
RBF bases, a faster processing time is obtained.
In Chapter 3, an autonomous malicious spam email detection system is pro-
posed in which RAN-LSH is adopted as a classi¯er model and an outlier detection
mechanism is implemented in RAN-LSH. The proposed malicious spam email de-
tection system has desirable characteristics as an online cyber-security system,
because the detection system can quickly adapt to new trends of malicious spam
emails with reliable detection. These characteristics are realized by introducing
incremental learning, outlier detection, and automatic malicious spam email an-
alyzer called SPIKE in the proposed detection system. Since the maliciousness
of most spam emails are judged by RAN-LSH, the number of times to execute
SPIKE is very limited. Therefore, the incremental learning for new malicious
spam emails is also conducted very quickly. This enables the proposed detection
system to operate in real-time under a practical environments.
In Chapter 4, a fast DDoS backscatter detection system is proposed to detect
DDoS attack from labeled and unlabeled packets using RAN-LSH classi¯er. Ba-
sically, it is not easy to detect DDoS backscatter for unlabeled packets. However,
it has been shown in this study that the proposed detection system is capable to
detect DDoS backscatter for not only labeled packets, but also unlabeled pack-
ets. To achieve the goal, the RAN-LSH classi¯er need to learn the general rule of
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DDoS backscatter in the 80/TCP and 53/UDP packets. After that, the updated
RAN-LSH classi¯er is used to detect both labeled and unlabeled packets. The
detection system has been proven capable to detect the DDoS backscatter in a
short time, which is shown by the experimental result, where the time to classify
a data would require less than 0.01 (sec.).
5.2 Future Work
There still remain several open problems in the proposed RAN-LSH classi¯er.
Although the learning time is reduced, the accuracy is also a little bit lower
than the conventional margin-based model RAN-MRG. One of the reasons is
that the hash functions of LSH are only generated in the initial learning and are
not adapted incrementally. One way to solve this problem is that the proposed
RAN-LSH can be extended not only by updating hash functions incrementally
but also by increasing the number of hash functions. This can be attained by
introducing Incremental PCA (IPCA)47) into the proposed RAN-LSH. However,
there is one problem for this. After updating/increasing hash functions, the
hash table should also be updated properly without unexpected forgetting of the
previous knowledge. If this problem is solved, it is expected that the idea of fast
processing for large-scale stream data using LSH would work well. As another
problem, the number of partition P should also be set properly in the LSH-based
data selection. As mentioned in 2.3, P is determined only from the initial training
data and it is ¯xed during the incremental learning. Since the data distributions
are always changed over time, P should be adapted to the change in the data
distributions.
As the incremental learning is carried out for a long time, it is expected that the
number of RBF could also increased excessively, which will cause longer learning
time. To overcome this problem, a pruning function for RBF bases is intended
to be added in future. Besides that, an adaptive hash table to adapt to the
changes of feature vectors from the recent BoW without forgetting the previous
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knowledge is planned to be included in the proposed system. It is expected that
the detection system would be more stable and robust to the new malicious spam
email attacks.
An automatic parameter tuning is planned to be developed to achieve high
detection rate. The parameters are RBF width ¾, the number of partitions P ,
error threshold ", distance threshold ±, accumulation ratio µa, tolerant distance µp,
output margin µm, outlier threshold µo, occurance frequency µN and the highest
network output µz.
The above issues are left as the future work.
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Appendix A
Algorithms From Chapter 1
A.1 Algorithm 1: Modi¯ed RAN Learning
Algorithm 1 Modi¯ed RAN Learning
Require: Data X 0 = f(xi;di;h(xi))gNi=1, RAN, hash table H and parameter µp.
Ensure: RAN.
1: for all (xi;di;h(xi)) 2X 0 do
2: Calculate the outputs z for xi by Eq. (1.2) and ¯nd the nearest center c
¤ to xi.
3: Calculate the error: E = kz(x)¡ dk=K
4: if E > " & kx¡ c¤k > ± then
5: Add an RBF unit (i.e., J Ã J + 1) and set an RBF center, and the connection weights:
cJ = xi, and wJ = di ¡ z.
6: Get an index set C of RBFs position in hash table as such h(cJ) is the eth entry in the hash
table HfCJ=eg: h(cJ) = h(¹xe).
7: else
8: Do LSH-based RBF Selection for training data (xi;di;h(xi)), an index set C of RBFs position
in hash table and an index set R of selected RBFs.
9: for all f(cj ;d)gj2R do
10: Calculate the outputs © for selected RBF centers cj (j 2 R) and a training data xi by
Eq. (1.1).
11: Decompose © using SVD and obtain the matrices V , H, U .
12: Update connection weights by Eq. (1.4)
13: end for
14: Calculate the outputs z for xi by Eq. (1.2).
15: Calculate the error: E = kz(x)¡ dk=K
16: if E > " then
17: Add a hidden unit and the connection weights: cJ = xi, and wJ = di ¡ z.
18: Get an index set C: CJ = e.
19: end if
20: end if
21: end for
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Appendix B
Algorithms From Chapter 2
B.1 Algorithm 2: RAN-LSH Learning Algorithm
Algorithm 2 RAN-LSH Learning Algorithm
Require: A set of Nd training dataX
0 = f(xi;di)gNdi=1, parameters: accumulation ratio µa and output
margin µm and tolerant distance µp.
1: Do Initialization using initial training data X0 = f(xi;di)gN0i=1. Get proper parameters RBF width
¾2, number o partitions P , an initial hash table H and additional outlier detection parameters in
Chapter 3: output margin for outlier detection µo and occurance frequency threshold µN .
2: Do RAN Learning to construct initial RAN.
3: loop
4: Input: A chunk of Nd training data X
0 = f(xi;di)gNdi=N0+1.
5: Do Update Hash Table to get hash values h(xi).
6: De¯ne X^
0
= f(xi;di;h(xi))gNdi=N0+1.
7: Do LSH-Based Data Selection and get a set of selected data X^
0
.
8: Do Modi¯ed RAN Learning for X^
0
.
9: Do Update Hash Table.
10: end loop
B.2 Algorithm 3: Initialization
Algorithm 3 Initialization
Require: Initial data set X0 = f(xi;di)gN0i=1, parameters µa, µm and µp.
Ensure: Hash table H, parameters ¾2 and P .
1: Do the cross validation for X0 to determine the parameters: the RBF width ¾
2 and the number
of partitions P .
2: Do PCA for X0, and obtain l eigenvectors U l such that the accumulation ratio is larger than µa.
3: for j=1 to l do
4: Calculate the jth projection values vij for all (xi;di) 2X0 by Eq. (2.1).
5: Calculate projection vector V and for each v 2 fv1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; vlg, ¯nd v+ and v¡.
6: end for
7: Do Update Hash Table to create initial hash table.
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B.3 Algorithm 4: Update Hash Table
Algorithm 4 Update Hash Table
Require: Data X 0 = f(xi;di)gNi=1 and hash table H = fhe; ¹xe; FMe ; FOe a; NegNHe=1.
Ensure: H.
1: Calculate the hash values h(xi) for all xi 2X 0 by Equations (2.2) - (2.3).
2: Find s(1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; S) subsets of unique hash values from fh(xi)gNi=1 so that hs ½ fh(xi)gNi=1.
3: Sort all xi 2X 0 into the corresponding subset hs where h(xi) = hs.
4: De¯ne all data in each subset as ~Xs.
5: for s = 1 to S do
6: if hs is registered in H (i.e., hs = he) & FMe = 1 then
7: Calculate the mean vector using Eq. (2.4)b or Eq. (3.4)c as a prototype ¹xe where n = j ~Xsj.
8: Set Nce Ã Ne + n.
9: print
10: else
11: Calculate the mean vector using Eq. (2.4)b or Eq. (3.4)c as ¹xe.
12: Calculate the output margin ¢z for ¹xe by Eq. (1.5) and set the margin °ag F
M
e by Eq.
(2.5)d or Eq. (4.1)e and outlier °ag FOe by Equations (3.3).
13: Set Nce Ã Ne + n.
14: Register fhe; ¹xe; FMe ; FOe ; Nege=NH+1 in H.
15: Set NH Ã NH + 1.
16: end if
17: end for
¤a¤ Note that outlier °ag F o is used only in malicious spam email detection system.
¤b¤ This equation is used in Chapter 2 and 4.
¤c¤ This equation is used in Chapter 3.
¤d¤ This equation is used in Chapter 2 and 3.
¤e¤ This equation is used in Chapter 4.
B.4 Algorithm 5: LSH-Based Data Selection
Algorithm 5 LSH-Based Data Selection
Require: X^
0
= f(xi;di;h(xi))gNd0i=N0+1 and hash table H.
Ensure: X^
0
= f(xi;di;h(xi))gNd0i=1 .
1: for all xi 2 X^ 0 do
2: Find h(xi) in H.
3: if FMe = 1 for a matched entry then
4: Remove xi from X^
0
and Nd0 Ã Nd0 ¡ 1.
5: end if
6: end for
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B.5 Algorithm 6: LSH-Based RBF Selection
Algorithm 6 LSH-Based RBF Selection
Require: Training data (xi;di;h(xi)), an index set C of RBFs position in hash table, an index set R
of selected RBFs, hash table H, and parameter µp.
Ensure: R
1: for j = 1 to J do
2: Get hash value of kth entry from hash table Hfk=Cjg: h(cj) = h(x^k) for some hash function.
3: Calculate LSH distance d¤j between hash values of the retrieved RBF centers h(cj) and a given
training data h(xi) using Eq. (2.6).
4: if d¤j · µp then
5: De¯ne a set R of selected RBF centers (i.e R Ã j).
6: end if
7: end for
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Appendix C
Algorithms From Chapter 3
C.1 Algorithm 7: Malicious Spam Email Detection Sys-
tem
Algorithm 7 Malicious Spam Email Detection System
Require: Double bounce email.
Ensure: The class label of double bounce email.
1: Do Pre-processing to generate feature vectors of training data X0 = f(xi;di)gNd0i=1 from double
bounce email.
2: Do the cross-validation for N0 initial training dataX0 = f(xi;di)gN0i=1 to determine the RBF width
¾, the number of partitions P , error threshold " and distance threshold ±. Determined the other
four parameters empirically; accumulation ratio µa, output margin µm, network output µz and
tolerant distance µp.
3: Do RAN-LSH Learning to construct initial RAN.
4: loop
5: Input: New double bounce email.
6: Do Pre-processing to generate feature vectors of test data X00 = f(xigNd00i=1 from double bounce
email.
7: TestX00 using the constructed RAN and obtain the class label of the test dataX00 = f(xi;di)g.
8: Do RAN-LSH Learning to learn new training data X0 ÃX00.
9: end loop
C.2 Algorithm 8: Pre-processing of Malicious Spam Email
Detection System
Algorithm 8 Pre-processing of Malicious Spam Email Detection
Require: Double bounce email.
Ensure: Malicious spam email data set: training dataX0 = f(xi;di)gNd0i=1 or test dataX00 = fxigNd00i=1 .
1: for all double bounce email do
2: Tokenization and lemmatization.
3: Selects Nf features using `1-SVM feature selection.
4: Feature representation using normalized TF-IDF.
5: end for
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C.3 Algorithm 9: Outlier Detection
Algorithm 9 Outlier Detection
Require: Test data X00 = fxigNi=1, hash table H and SPIKE.
Ensure: Class label di
1: loop
2: Calculate the hash value h(xi) by Eqs. (2.1) - (2.3).
3: Find h(xi) in H.
4: if FOe = 0 then
5: Assign the data as outliers.
6: Get class label di using SPIKE.
7: else
8: Get class label di using the spam email detection system.
9: end if
10: end loop
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Appendix D
Algorithms From Chapter 4
D.1 Algorithm 10: DDoS Backscatter Detection
Algorithm 10 DDoS Backscatter Detection
Require: Darknet packets from 80/TCP and 53/UDP.
Ensure: The class label of given darknet packets.
1: Do Pre-processing to generate feature vectors of training data X0 = f(xi;di)gNd0i=1 from darknet
packets.
2: Do the cross-validation for N0 initial training dataX0 = f(xi;di)gN0i=1 to determine the RBF width
¾, the number of partitions P , error threshold " and distance threshold ±. Determined the other
four parameters empirically; accumulation ratio µa, output margin µm, network output µz and
tolerant distance µp.
3: Do RAN-LSH Learning to construct initial RAN.
4: loop
5: Input: New darknet packets from other than 80/TCP and 53/UDP.
6: Do Pre-processing to generate feature vectors of test dataX00 = f(xigNd00i=1 from darknet packets.
7: TestX00 using the constructed RAN and obtain the class label of the test dataX00 = f(xi;di)g.
8: Do RAN-LSH Learning to learn new training data X0 ÃX00.
9: end loop
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D.2 Algorithm 11: Pre-processing of DDoS Backscatter
Detection
Algorithm 11 Pre-processing of DDoS Backscatter Detection
Require: Darknet packets.
Ensure: DDoS backscatter data set: training data X0 = f(xi;di)gNd0i=1 or test data X00 = fxigNd00i=1 .
1: for all darknet packets do
2: Sort the darknet packet by the source IP addresses.
3: if time interval between two sequence of packets ¸ one hour then
4: De¯ne a new data set iÃ i+ 1.
5: Extract 17 features from the packets of the ¯rst one minute time-window.
6: if the darknet packets are training data then
7: Do Labeling
8: Create ith feature vector fxi;dig.
9: else if the darknet packets are test data then
10: Create ith feature vector fxig.
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
D.3 Algorithm 12: Labeling (for TCP Port 80 and UDP
Port 53)
Algorithm 12 Labeling (for 80/TCP and 53/UDP)
Require: Input data containing 17 features.
Ensure: Class label di.
1: loop
2: if the packets are from 80/TCP then
3: if (SYN=1 and ACK=1) k (RST=1 and ACK=1) k (RST=1) then
4: Response °ag FR = 1.
5: end if
6: else if the packets are from 53/UDP then
7: if the Query/Response °ag QR=1 (domain name contains http, www, com) then
8: Response °ag FR = 1.
9: end if
10: end if
11: if Number of packets sent in one minute ¸ 40 FR = 1 then
12: Label the packet as DDoS backscatter di = f10g.
13: else
14: Label the packet as DDoS non-backscatter di = f01g.
15: end if
16: end loop
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Appendix E
Thesis Outlines Mind Mapping
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E.1 Mind Mapping of Chapter 1
Figure E.1 Outline of Chapter 1.
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E.2 Mind Mapping of Chapter 2
Figure E.2 Outline of Chapter 2.
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E.3 Mind Mapping of Chapter 3
Figure E.3 Outline of Chapter 3.
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E.4 Mind Mapping of Chapter 4
Figure E.4 Outline of Chapter 4.
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